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The U.S. has experienced runaway economic inequality since the 1970s, yet there is not strong
public support for government efforts that serve to narrow the growing disparities between citizens.
My dissertation examines why we see the public respond in this way. I argue that public preferences
for equality are conditional, where we support equalizing policies as long as they perceive the
beneficiaries as people like themselves. However, rising racial diversity has contributed to an
empathy gap between Americans. Consequently, the less people see other citizens as people like
ourselves, the weaker their support is for government efforts to help others. I use individual and
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CHAPTER 1: INEQUALITY AND CONDITIONAL PREFERENCES
Inequality poses a challenge for nations across the globe — yet the United States is often seen
as exceptional. Not only is the U.S. experiencing high levels of income and wealth inequality
historically, but it is one of the most unequal industrialized democratic nations. How did one of the
world’s richest democracies also become one of the most unequal? The state of economic inequality is
shaped largely by government policy and parties in power (Kelly, 2009; Bartels, 2016). Scholars have
also theorized that the U.S. lacks the institutional structure for larger-scale redistribution (Alesina and
Glaeser, 2004) and that policymakers are more responsive to the interests of the rich and organized
interests than the average citizen (Gilens and Page, 2014). Though, what is particularly puzzling is
the response of the American public: over time citizens have not met rising inequality with stronger
demands for government efforts aimed at decreasing inequality. There leaves more work to be done
to understand why the public has met rising inequality with limited liberalism.
Scholars continue to be puzzled by the fact that as economic inequality in the U.S. has risen
dramatically in the past few decades, the public has not demanded more expansive redistributive
policies at a rate we would expect given these extreme disparities. When considering the nation
as a whole, some research suggests the public has in fact become more conservative (i.e. wants
the government to do less) in response to rising inequality beginning in the 1970s (Kelly and Enns,
2010; Luttig, 2013). More so puzzling, this trend in policy preferences transcends class divides.
Even among many low income voters—those on the losing end of inequality who have more to gain
from greater redistribution—there is a continuing resistance to bigger government (Kelly and Enns,
2010; Kelly, 2020; Cramer, 2016; Hochschild, 2018). Recently, researchers have drawn attention to
important factors that come to play a role in redistributive preferences in light of rising inequality,
including subnational economic contexts (Franko and Witko, 2017) and the types of redistribution
being considered (Cavaillé and Trump, 2015). For example, Franko (2016) finds that when examining
inequality at the state level, growth in income inequality leads to greater levels of public support for
redistribution. Moreover, McCall (2013) argues that nontraditional forms of redistribution which
focus on opportunity expansion, such as education, are a more preferred avenue for addressing
inequalities among the public than cash assistance programs, such as welfare. But how can we
reconcile these findings with the trends we see at the national level? On the one hand, there is
evidence state inequality leads citizens to become more supportive of redistribution, particularly for
education (Franko, 2016); yet the opposite is true when shifting the unit of analysis to the nation
(Kelly and Enns, 2010). Indeed, even aggregate support for education spending has in fact not
risen since the late 1980s.1 Ultimately, there is still more to understand concerning how the public
responds to rising inequality, and just as importantly, why.
Why should we expect Americans to respond to growing inequality by supporting policies
that decrease inequality? And why is it so puzzling that they do not? First, from a pure economic
resources perspective, as the proportion of total income continues to funnel into a narrow segment of
society at the top, the rest of Americans are relatively worse off. Thus, as inequality increases, the
number of people that stand to benefit economically from policies that help to equalize resources
also increases. Second, Americans are increasingly aware of rising inequality (Stimson and Wager,
2020; Franko, 2017), dislike inequality, and would like to see the gap between the rich and poor
to narrow (McCall, 2013; Piston, 2018). For example, in 2016, when asked if they believe the
government has gone too far, not gone far enough, or just about right to address income inequality,
only 7% of Americans reported that government had gone too far.2 This indicates that, at least in the
abstract, most Americans are not opposed to reducing inequality. Lastly, public preferences are not
inconsequential. Aggregate opinion toward policy shapes election and policy outcomes in ways that
can effectively reduce disparities (Kelly, 2009). Thus Americans’ weak support for the expansion of
government efforts to target inequality has in fact allowed for greater inequality, contributing to a
pernicious self-reinforcing cycle (Kelly, 2020).
Popular economic models of redistributive preferences (Meltzer and Richard, 1981; Benabou,
2000), while having some explanatory power in other national contexts, are unable to fully explain
the trend we observe in the U.S. It is possible these models lack predictive power in the American
context because they ignore characteristics specific to the U.S. electorate. For example, although
Americans in principle endorse equality, they often fail to translate this sentiment into support for
1For an illustration of this trend, see appendix.
2Associated Press-NORC GenForward Survey, September, 2016.
2
the appropriate policies (Bartels, 2016; Kluegel and Smith, 1986). Early work in political science
attributed this disconnect to the value conflict that emerges between egalitarianism and traditional
American values, such as economic individualism and meritocracy (McClosky and Zaller, 1984).
However, recent scholarship has sought to reevaluate some of these characterizations. For example,
McCall (2013) demonstrates that the belief one can get ahead with hard work is not related to beliefs
about the causes of inequality. This implies that simply endorsing meritocracy does not necessarily
mean one perceives the state of inequality as deserved. Further, in contrast to meritocratic notions
that the rich and poor are deserving of their status, Piston (2018) illustrates there exists resentment
toward the rich (and sympathy for the poor) among the public. Taken together, American values,
ignorance, or apathy toward disparities cannot fully explain Americans’ economic conservatism in
the face of rising inequality.
1.1 Race and Redistribution
Racial and ethnic divisions provide one of the most formidable challenges to stronger welfare states.
For example, greater racial diversity is related to lower levels of welfare spending at both the national
and subnational level (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004; Alesina et al., 1999; Desmet et al., 2009; Hero
and Tolbert, 1996; Filindra, 2013). Scholars attribute this association frequently (and implicitly)
to voter preferences: the majority group will oppose government spending the more they perceive
other racial groups as the beneficiaries. However, scholars examining the causal effect of diversity
on public preferences across the globe have come to mixed conclusions, where evidence supporting
the diversity theory is often drawn from the U.S. context (Steele, 2016). Specifically, the American
public’s opposition to welfare has been traced back to the racialized discourse of welfare policies,
which reinforced the stereotype that blacks were disproportionate and undeserving beneficiaries
(Gilens, 1999; Quadagno, 1994). However, welfare spending is not unwaveringly opposed: individual
support for welfare rises when the perceived number of beneficiaries from their own racial group
increases (Luttmer, 2001). And while there is evidence demonstrating racial considerations play a
significant role in Americans’ attitudes toward welfare, welfare constitutes a only small fraction of
domestic spending (Kelly, 2009). The central puzzle of this dissertation is why the American public
responds to rising inequality with less liberalism overall—not just attitudes toward welfare. We thus
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need to understand what common thread connects the public’s perception of various redistributive
policies that target inequality.
While scholarship discussing the racialization of government programs frequently points to
welfare, other programs that target income inequality are subject to racialization as well. Social
Security, Medicare, and public education have historically experienced more support from voters than
welfare (Stimson, 2015). As the perceived beneficiaries of these policies changes, however, so too
should the level of public support. For example, social scientists have found evidence of a “Florida
effect,” where the state’s average public-school student is Latinx, but the average taxpayer is white.
In turn, there is less support for education spending in states like Florida than in states where students
and taxpayers are more likely to be of the same race (Harris et al., 2001; Poterba, 1997). These studies
are illustrative of a large literature demonstrating social identities shape redistributive preferences,
where group members are more likely to support policies when they share a social identity with the
perceived beneficiaries (see Costa-Font and Cowell 2015 for a review). This pattern of behavior
is explained by the tendency for group members to have favoritism towards their ingroup (Tajfel
and Turner, 1986). Indeed, people often perceive ingroup members as more similar to themselves
than outgroup members; because we feel closer and more connected to ingroup members, we also
tend to feel greater empathy and responsibility toward ingroup members than we do for outgroup
members (Mullen et al., 1992). And although other social identities splinter the American public,
race is undoubtedly one the most consistently salient and divisive (Hutchings and Valentino, 2004).
This suggests that support for equalizing policies is shaped to some extent by perceptions of who
benefits, and this is informed — at least partially — by the racial identities of those beneficiaries.
1.2 Why Preferences for Equality are Conditional
While whites continue to constitute a narrow majority in the U.S., the racial fabric of the country
has become decreasingly homogeneous. But what effect should this have on Americans’ support
for measures targeting inequality? We know that Americans are increasingly aware of inequality,
dislike inequality and would like to see the U.S. become a more equal nation. Given this, as
income disparities continue to grow, we would presume that Americans would respond by supporting
government policies that serve to narrow this gap. However, I argue that what citizens really believe
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in is conditional equality, where they support equalizing policies as long as they perceive the policy
beneficiaries as “people like us.”
Experimental research demonstrates that inducing economic anxiety can have significant im-
plications for individuals’ willingness to help others. Specifically, contexts of economic scarcity or
inequality shift the way people respond to members of other social groups. For example, scarcity can
lead people to devalue others’ deservingness and can foster antipathy toward other social groups,
strengthen negative out-group stereotypes (Krosch and Amodio, 2014) and increase the likelihood of
discriminatory resource allocation (LeVine and Campbell, 1972; Sherif, 1966). Recently Condon and
Wichowsky (2020) found that priming inequality increases social comparison, particularly downward
comparison, which induces anxiety. This is important in that feelings of anxiety or threat lead people
to be more selective in who they empathize with: people will exhibit more empathy toward those
who are more similar to them than they are to those who are different (Arceneaux, 2017). And when
one feels unempathetic for a person, they are less likely to support helping them (De Waal, 2008).
The idea that redistributive preferences are shaped by empathy is consistent with the social
affinity literature, which suggests that the degree to which we care about others is shaped by how
closely we perceive them as like ourselves. This phenomenon is highlighted by work demonstrating
support for redistribution declines when people perceive that it benefits the undeserving, particularly
racial outgroups (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004; Luttmer, 2001; Gilens, 1999). Notably, there are other
related theories predicting the mechanism through which race shapes public opinion. For example,
when members of a dominant group, such as whites in the U.S., perceive their dominant status (as
those at the top of the racial hierarchy) to be threatened by racial others, this leads to the activation
of racial prejudice (Blumer, 1958; Bobo and Hutchings, 1996). While racial group threat can be
felt by whites for a variety of reasons, a growing minority population is one driver of perceptions
of threat (Christiani, 2020; Jardina, 2019). Though empathy is certainly linked to threat, there are
cases where low levels of racial empathy can still be found among those who do not perceive racial
others as significant threats. In addition to racial threat, increases in diversity are also associated with
lower levels of social trust and social capital (Putnam, 2007; Hero, 2007). Thus empathy can be one
way, but not necessarily the only way, in which race and redistributive preferences are connected.
However, recent scholarship demonstrates that empathy, more so than other traits such as trust or
resentment, is a strong predictor of support for policies that help others (Sirin et al., 2016). Since
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I am interested in explaining preferences for inequality-reducing policies, examining empathy is
appropriate, given how important it is in explaining people’s willingness or refusal to help others.
Though Americans’ conceptions of “people like us,” or their community, can expand beyond
members of their own racial in-group and include other out-group members (Wong, 2010), race and
ethnicity remain a critical factor in shaping perceptions of closeness to other people (Wilkinson,
2015). Table 1.1 shows the percent of white and black Americans who report feeling somewhat or
very close to whites, blacks, Hispanics and Asians. By a large margin, both whites and blacks feel
closer to their own racial group than any of the other three groups.3
Table 1.1: Percent of Americans Feeling Somewhat Close or Very Close to Different Racial/Ethnic
Groups
Racial Close to Whites Close to Blacks Close to Asians Close to Hispanics
Group (%) (%) (%) (%)
Whites 70.3 33.5 52.04 44.37
Blacks 45.2 76.9 39.3 52.0
Data comes from 2000 General Social Survey. Whites (n=1434). Blacks (n=264).
1.2.1 Theory
When people consider their environment and see it is composed of members of racial out-groups,
it signals that there are more of “them” and fewer of “us.” They should then have a heightened
perception that the public is composed of others, and in turn, they will be less likely to perceive “us”
as the beneficiaries of social policies. Since people are more likely to give to members of their own
racial group, they will be less likely to support government intervention when racial homogeneity
declines. In this case, the public will be less willing to support equalizing policies in response to
increases in inequality. However, when contexts are more homogeneous, citizens should be more
likely to empathize with those around them and in turn policy beneficiaries. They then will respond
to inequality by wanting the government to do more. Thus, voters’ redistributive preferences should
be a function of rising income inequality conditional on the racial diversity of their contexts. I expect
that as racial diversity increases, the less likely the public should respond to increasing inequality
3The disparity between feelings of closeness with racial ingroup and outgroup members persists from 1996
through 2016. Table 1.1 illustrates survey data from 2000 because it was the only year the General Social
Survey (GSS) asked survey respondents about their sense of closeness to Asians and Hispanics. The GSS
only codes respondents’ race into one of three categories (white, black or other).
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with support greater redistribution of resources. This accounts for those in homogeneous contexts,
who on average should respond to inequality with demand for greater redistribution. This theory also
accounts for those in diverse contexts, who I expect to respond to inequality with less demand for
redistribution.
This theory also allows me to try to reconcile scholars’ findings at different units of analysis.
Recall that at the state level rising inequality leads to demand for greater redistribution (Franko,
2016), yet this is seemingly a direct contradiction to Kelly and Enns’ (2010) findings at the national
level. My expectations indicate that in some contexts inequality can indeed lead to demand for
redistribution—under the right conditions. But these conditions (racial homogeneity) have become
increasingly rare over the past few decades.4
1.3 Overview
In what follows, I first provide evidence for these claims in two empirical chapters. Chapter 2 directly
tests my theory at the aggregate level. Using time-series cross-sectional data of the American states
for over a 40 year time span, I demonstrate that as racial diversity increases, the likelihood the public
will respond to increasing inequality by supporting bigger government declines. I also use individual
level survey data to demonstrate that when states are more racially diverse, residents are less likely to
feel a part of the people in their state. Further, my findings suggest that whites are one of the driving
forces behind the patterns we see in macro attitudes.
Chapter 3 focuses on the micro-level processes that should drive the trends we see at the macro
level. I explore the individual level mechanism through which I argue inequality, race and policy
preferences in America are connected—empathy. Recent research indicates that one of the ways
in which people experience growing inequality is through economic anxiety. Using an original
nationally representative survey, I examine how conditions that heighten economic anxiety affect
how people relate empathically to outgroups. I use the economic crisis incited by COVID-19, which
has had devastating effects on the personal financial situations of some more than others, to leverage
variation in economic anxiety. I find that whites who are most economically vulnerable (e.g., lower
4In Franko’s (2016) supplemental materials he touches on the role that the racial make-up has in the mass
response to inequality, but this expectation is intended to be more developed both theoretically and empirically
here.
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income and in poor employment situations) are less likely to have concern for racial outgroups. These
findings contribute to a growing literature exploring the puzzling lack of support for low-income
citizens, particularly among whites, for bigger government.
Chapter 4 and 5 expand upon my empirical research using much less common methods. I ask,
what else are we perhaps missing that surveys haven’t quite captured? These chapters document a
series of findings gathered during months of fieldwork research in South Carolina and West Virginia.
This qualitative work explores how average people discuss topics related to inequality, and how this
relates to racial or economic dynamics they are exposed to in their own lives. Chapter 4 outlines
how regions for study were selected and the methods I relied on in the field. Chapter 5 offers an
in-depth illustration of two regional areas — the Lowcountry, South Carolina and Greenbrier Valley,
West Virginia. The illustrations of these contexts help put into perspective the opinions of those
I interviewed. Using data from qualitative interviews and focus groups, I find that people’s ideas
about inequality vary considerably. A bridging theme throughout my research was the importance
of reference groups that we compare ourselves to. Inequality was rarely, if ever, discussed in terms
of estate taxes or deregulation of the labor market. Instead, people talk about both the deserved or
undeserved (mis)fortunes of people in their own lives or regional contexts, who they typically either
see as people who are and are not like themselves.
I provide a summary of the contributions and implications of this dissertation in Chapter 6.
Taken together, my empirical and qualitative findings point to the importance of social groups and
empathy in the politics of inequality in the U.S. I discuss the implications of an empathy deficit for
inequality, and conclude by highlighting how empathy can help counter an ostensibly inevitable
cycle of self reinforcing inequality.
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CHAPTER 2: INEQUALITY IN MACRO POLITICS
To understand why mass preferences have not moved further to the left in the face of rising
inequality, I look to the role of race. While the role of racial and ethnic groups in redistributive
politics is a topic of deep discussion in the comparative politics literature, it has been given far less
attention in extant scholarship on income inequality in the U.S. Yet race is one of the most salient
group divisions in the country, and it has been inextricably entangled with economic inequality for
centuries. Ultimately, examining how race shapes public opinion is necessary to understand the
American public’s response to inequality.
In this chapter, I help explain the American public’s limited levels of liberalism by pointing to
the role of increasing racial and ethnic diversity. Recall my theory predicts that Americans support
equality-enhancing policies conditional on the notion that they perceive fellow citizens as “people
like me.” The more citizens identify with one another, the more likely they are to empathize with and
in turn support policies that benefit others. However, as the racial fabric in various corners of the U.S.
steadily becomes less homogeneous, the likelihood of this condition declines. The less often people
see others around them as people like themselves, the less likely it is that the public supports policies
aimed at helping others and equalizing resources.
To test my theory, I build on recent important work (Franko and Witko, 2017; Franko, 2016) by
highlighting the relevance of subnational context in shaping redistributive preferences. Specifically, I
leverage variation in both inequality and racial homogeneity of the American states. Using time-series
cross-sectional data for an almost 45-year time span, I find evidence that as racial diversity increases,
the less likely the mass public responds to increasing inequality by wanting government to do more.
This is true for opinion toward redistributive policies collectively, as well as policy-specific attitudes
— including support for welfare and public education spending. Moreover, I find this this pattern is
specific to economic liberalism, not liberalism on social issues (e.g., gay rights, prayer in school).
Finally, I demonstrate that both rising levels and changes of racial diversity shape public opinion
in this way. While these findings fit into a large literature in comparative politics that identifies the
relationship between national diversity and social policy, my contribution lies in providing evidence
of the typically implied (but not always tested) intermediary between diversity and redistributive
policies: aggregate preferences.
2.1 Design
The notion that we are more likely to help people that we perceive as people like ourselves is
not new to the political science literature. Recent work demonstrates that Americans’ perceptions
of the “other” have implications for their redistributive preferences, where we are more likely to
want to help others that we perceive are like us (Wong, 2010; Theiss-Morse, 2009). However, this
scholarship does not consider how rising levels of inequality, combined with racial diversity, shapes
citizens’ willingness to help other citizens. Moreover, these findings often rely on cross-sectional
data at the individual level. I opt to test my expectations over time at the aggregate level, where
there are direct implications for policy outcomes at both the state and federal level (Caughey and
Warshaw, 2017; Erikson et al., 1993; Stimson et al., 1995). Given that scholarship examining the
consequences of diversity for redistributive politics often looks to policy output or government
spending as the outcome variable, I shift the attention to the presumed intermediary between diversity
and policy—aggregate preferences.
To test the conditional effect of rising diversity on the aggregate public’s response to inequality,
I turn to the American states. While scholarship examining the public’s response to inequality has
used the nation as the unit of analysis, there is substantial variation in both income inequality and
racial diversity across states. Further, at the national level economic inequality and racial diversity
trend upwards over time and are highly correlated; thus, a national level analysis risks spurious
inference. For this reason, variation across states is particularly useful in assessing the interactive
effect of diversity and inequality. States also have authority over various policy domains, and in turn,
have power to shape economic outcomes. From Medicaid expansion to welfare benefit requirements
to public education, state decisions on spending and taxation shape state economic inequality (Kelly
and Witko, 2012; Franko and Witko, 2017). As described earlier, recent scholarship on inequality
has also directed our attention to the states, demonstrating that people accurately perceive changes in
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inequality in their state over time (Franko, 2017) and policy preferences are responsive to inequality
(Franko, 2016).
Testing my theory at the state level helps to reconcile scholars’ findings at different units of
analysis. Recall that rising inequality within states leads to demand for greater redistribution (Franko,
2016), yet this is seemingly a direct contradiction to Kelly and Enns’ (2010) findings at the national
level. However, I argue that in some contexts inequality can indeed lead to demand for redistribution—
under the right conditions. But these conditions (racial homogeneity) have become increasingly rare
over the past few decades.1
To illustrate the changing racial make-up of the U.S., Figure 2.1 maps the racial diversity in each
state in 1970 and 2014, respectively. Higher values on the diversity index (darker shades) indicate
there is a lower probability that two randomly selected individuals in a state are of the same race.
A comparison of the figures suggests there is variance both across time and across states. While
Southern states on average are typically more racially diverse than the majority of the country, over
time most states across the nation have become more diverse.2 Variations in income inequality over
time are shown at the bottom of Figure 2.1. The maps illustrate the share of income that goes to the
top 1% of earners in each state in both 1970 and 2014, where higher values indicate more inequality.
In 1970, almost all states’ top earners earned less than 10% of the total income earned in the state.
By 2014, almost all states’ top 1% earn 15-30% of the total income earned in the state.3
One of the primary drawbacks of prior scholarship that tests the relationship between diversity
and opinion is the inability to identify causation, often a result of studying a single point in time
(Stichnoth and Van der Straeten, 2013; Steele, 2016). While previous work has been informative,
a dynamic analysis offers greater certainty that we are testing the presence of causal processes
(Stimson, 1985). To determine the effect of state-level inequality and racial diversity on state public
opinion, I make use of time-series cross-sectional data from 1970 through 2014 for all American
1In Franko’s (2016) supplemental materials he touches on the role that the racial make-up has in the mass
response to inequality, but this expectation is intended to be more developed both theoretically and empirically
here.
2To better illustrate this scope of this range consider the diversity scores of two states in 2014: Vermont (.07)
and North Carolina (.42). Based on Census data, in 2014 Vermont was 96.2% white, 1.6% black, and 2.1%
are classified as “other.” In North Carolina, 72.4% were white, 22.9% were black, and 4.7% are “other.”
3More detailed graphical illustrations of racial diversity, inequality, as well as economic public liberalism, by
state over time are provided in the appendix.
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(a) Racial Diversity (1970) (b) Racial Diversity (2014)
(c) Income Inequality (1970) (d) Income Inequality(2014)
Figure 2.1: Racial Diversity and Income Inequality by State Over Time
(Darker shades indicate more diversity and more inequality.)
states. By examining how variation in racial diversity shapes the public’s response to inequality,
this approach improves upon and complements other work that relies on cross-sectional data. This
dataset is also valuable in its breadth by allowing me to model public opinion across every American
state over several decades.
Liberalism, broadly defined, is the preference for bigger government (Ellis and Stimson, 2012).
According to my theory, racial diversity should shape voter liberalism for a range of policies targeting
inequality. As long as the policy in question — whether it is aimed more at equalizing outcomes
or opportunity — is ultimately about who gets what, it falls under the economic issue umbrella. To
measure overall attitudes toward larger government at the state level, I rely on the state economic
liberalism measure from provided by Caughey and Warshaw (2017), who use a dynamic, hierarchical
group-level item-response (IRT) model to infer latent measures of public opinion by state. The
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measure is similar in nature to Stimson’s (1991) public policy mood, which aggregates thousands of
responses to various survey questions across a variety of issue domains, providing a general indicator
of sentiment for preferences for policy change over time. Although others have developed estimates
of public opinion and ideology at the state level (Enns and Koch, 2013; Berry et al., 2007), I opt
to use the Caughey and Warshaw estimates for several reasons. First, because this study involves
assessing economic preferences, and not necessarily overall liberalism, these estimates of state public
opinion are useful because they have been divided into separate economic and social dimensions.
Although public mood for social and economic issues often move in close parallel over time at the
national level (Stimson, 2015), there is variation between the two at the state level. Economic survey
items address issues like taxes, social welfare, and labor regulation, while social issue items measure
attitudes toward abortion, gay rights, and other cultural — though not racial — issues. My objective
is to measure preferences for more or less government intervention in economic outcomes — thus,
using economic liberalism as the outcome variable is the appropriate choice.4 Further, I choose to use
the IRT estimates as my dependent variable because this approach to modeling opinion data accounts
for the paucity of questions asked consistently over time. Finally, this data is also available over an
extensive period of time for all states. I refer to this variable as Public Economic Liberalism, where
higher values indicate increases in economic liberalism. To ensure that state rising diversity and
inequality are specifically affecting economic liberalism and not overall liberalism, I also estimate a
model predicting public social liberalism.
In addition to overall economic liberalism, I include two other measures, support for welfare and
education spending, as alternative outcome variables to evaluate the influence of inequality and racial
diversity on public support for specific redistributive policies. Following Franko (2016), I include
these variables to determine if and how the public is responsive to state racial and economic contexts
for certain types of redistributive policies. Education and welfare offer strong foils to one another.
While both serve to narrow the equality gap, they do so in different ways. Further, Americans
notoriously dislike welfare, while they simultaneously perceive public education as a more preferable
way to address rising inequality (McCall, 2013). Public opinion toward spending on education
4Not all of these economic policy domains fall within our conventional understanding of government liberalism.
However, there are many ways in which government can equalize economic resources among its citizens that
extends beyond the narrow scope of social welfare (Kelly, 2009; McCall, 2016).
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and welfare at the state level were estimated through multilevel regression with post-stratification
by Pacheco (2014). The author provides the percent in each state population that supports more
spending annually for welfare (1974-2000) and education (1975-2000). These two variables I refer
to as Welfare support and Education support. These variables were recoded to a 0 to 1 scale where
higher values indicate preferences for more government spending.
The first key explanatory variable used to test my expectations discussed above is the Top 1%
income share in each state by year (Frank, 2009). Top income share is the proportion of total income
held by the top 1% of income earners in each state, where higher values indicate more state-level
inequality. There are many ways to estimate economic inequality (Frank, 2009), but I choose this
variable because it reflects the skew of the changing income distribution, as rising income disparities
are largely a result of the rapid expansion of incomes at the top (Piketty, 2017). Further, recent
work has shown that state publics’ perceptions of inequality accurately follow objective measures,
including top 1% and 10% income shares; however, perceptions do not as closely follow changes in
the Gini coefficient, a discipline standard for estimating inequality (Franko, 2017).5
The second explanatory variable is Racial Diversity. To calculate racial diversity into a single
index, I rely upon the Herfindahl index, which is the estimated probability that two randomly selected
individuals are from the same group. This measure has been widely used in research examining the
consequences of diversity (Alesina et al., 1999; Hopkins, 2011; Putnam, 2007; Trounstine, 2016).
Diversity is calculated as 1 minus the Herfindahl index. The formula is defined below:




where D = Diversity, N = number of groups, and r = the size of each group as a percentage of the
population. The variable is coded from 0 to 1, and higher values on the index indicate a declining
probability that two randomly selected residents are of the same racial group.
Obtaining reliable data on race over a long time period that includes multiple racial/ethnic groups
is difficult. Over the decades, the Census Bureau’s method for collecting data on race has evolved
substantially, increasing the number of racial and ethnic categories one can identify with and allowing
5For a robustness check, models were estimated using the Gini coefficient as an indicator of inequality. See
appendix.
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for identification with more than one category. In order to use a measure that is consistent over time,
I rely on data provided by the Survey of Epidemiology and End Results Program (SEER). Using race
estimates provided by the census to the National Cancer Institute, SEER has calculated race estimates
at the subnational level since 1969. This measure categorizes people into one of three groups — white,
black and “other.” In this categorization scheme, “white” includes both Hispanic and non-Hispanic
whites, and thus my indicator for diversity is an underestimation of actual diversity (in some places
more than others). However, given its long time span, I use this racial data as my main measure of
racial diversity. While this measure cannot capture the proportion of those who are Latinx/Hispanic,
it does account for percent black. Though percent black at the national level has remained level, we
do see variation over time at the state level such as in Maryland, New York and Georgia.6 Given
that this measure cannot perfectly capture racial diversity, for robustness I also look to more recent
data on race that accounts for multiple racial and ethnic groups. Specifically, I rely on recent Census
data that reports the proportion of whites, blacks, Asians, Latinos and Native Americans for every
state-year between 1990 and 2014. This data is available for a significantly shorter time period than
my original measure. But when diversity is calculated (Herfindahl index) using this alternative data
on race, I find the two diversity indicators are highly correlated (ρ =.87). I also estimate models
using this more detailed indicator of diversity, and the findings help to corroborate the main results
presented here. More details on these measures of racial diversity are discussed in later sections of
this study as well as in the appendix.
One question that arises is whether the public is even aware of the racial make-up of their
environment. But Americans may be better at picking up on objective realities over time than those
skeptical assume (Stimson and Wager, 2020). While I do not expect the average citizen can estimate
the racial make-up of their state with precision, I do assume residents of Vermont perceive their
state as whiter than residents of Alabama. This assumption is supported by research demonstrating
individuals are able to perceive objective trends in both economic and racial context in local contexts
(Newman et al., 2015). Further, there is debate over whether it is levels of racial diversity or changes
in racial diversity that are really the driving force behind changing political preferences. Both higher
levels and changes in racial diversity can signal diversity, and I see no reason to treat the two as
6For an illustration of racial statistics over time by state, see appendix.
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mutually exclusive in terms of their effect on liberalism. Thus, I consider not only baseline levels
but change. To create a measure of change in diversity, I simply subtract the lagged value of racial
diversity from its current value. For this variable, Racial Diversity ∆, negative values indicate a
decrease in the diversity indicator (less diverse) from the previous year and positive values indicate
an increase in diversity.
Similar to recent work on public responsiveness to inequality (Wright, 2018; Franko, 2016;
Macdonald, 2019), I include a series of control variables that influence public opinion on economic
issues. These include the unemployment rate7, the percent of state residents who are part of a
union, the natural log of the population, the natural log of mean income as controls. I also control
for state macropartisanship defined as the percent of each states’ population that identifies as a
Democrat, using estimates provided by Caughey and Warshaw (2017). Further, to control for the
potential of a policy feedback effect (Soroka and Wlezien, 2010), a measure of government Economic
Policy Liberalism calculated by Caughey and Warshaw (2016), is included. This measure of policy
liberalism is based on hundreds of state policies and was estimated using a dynamic Bayesian
factor-analytic model for mixed data. The authors again split policy liberalism into two dimensions:
economic and social. For my main models, I only include the former as a control. Economic
government liberalism covers a wide range of policy areas, including social welfare, taxation and
labor but excludes policies on cultural and social issues.8 Higher values indicate greater government
expansion. Finally, to account for the possibility that preferences for spending may be a response to
actual levels of spending for specific policies, I control for per capita spending in each state annually
for both public education and welfare (see Franko 2016). All variables were measured at the state
level by year. The descriptive statistics for the main variables of interests can be seen in Table 2.1.9
To determine the effect of state level inequality and racial diversity on public opinion, I estimate
a time-series, cross-sectional model, with both state and year fixed effects. The year fixed effects
are aimed to account for national-level shocks and the state fixed effects are intended to account
for time invariant differences across states. The inclusion of fixed effects is a conservative choice,
7State unemployment data is available only after 1975.
8The data for both state public and policy liberalism was provided directly by Caughey and Washaw, from
which I used the posterior means for economic and social/public and policy liberalism for each state-year in
their dataset.
9Descriptive statistics for all variables used are in the appendix.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Min Max Mean
Racial Diversity 0.01 0.52 0.23
Top 1% Income Share 4.01 36.07 13.44
Economic Public Liberalism -3.60 2.72 -0.20
Economic Policy Liberalism -2.24 3.32 0.02
Welfare Support 8.90 49.20 18.50
Education Support 36.20 78.42 63.92
placing a more rigorous screen on spuriousness.10 The first model is defined below, where s and t
index the states and years in my dataset, yst is aggregate opinion, Ist is an indicator of inequality,
and Dst is an indicator of racial diversity in that year. β1 and β2 are the effects of inequality and
diversity, respectively. This model also includes an interaction between the two explanatory variables:
inequality and racial diversity, captured by β3IstDst.11 Lastly, to account for over time dynamics
(Beck and Katz, 1995; 2011), I include a lagged dependent variable, denoted by β4yst−1, in the
model.12
ys,t = β1Ist + β2Dst + β3IstDst + β4yst−1 + αs + εt + εst
2.2 How Diversity Conditions the Effect of Rising Inequality
The regression model results are shown in Table 2.2, where the dependent variable for the first three
models is the public’s economic liberalism. My theory predicts that racial diversity should condition
the effect of inequality on citizens preferences’ for greater government. The first model contains an
interaction term between inequality and racial diversity, excluding control variables. If my hypothesis
is correct, this interaction term should be significant and negative. Indeed, confirming expectations,
10A Lagrange Multiplier Test and Hausman Test confirmed the need to include fixed effects for both year and
state in the model. Augmented Dickey-Fuller Tests indicated that all dependent variables (public liberalism,
welfare support, and education support) do not have unit roots.
11This model specification estimates the contemporaneous effect of the independent variables on the outcome
variable. However, these effects could also be distributed over time (De Boef and Keele, 2008). I estimated a
series of autoregressive distributed lag models examining the separate effect of inequality and diversity on
public liberalism at different lag lengths. Higher order lags did not decrease information criteria for either
models, suggesting that the zero lag specification I include is appropriate. See appendix.
12I also estimate separate models that account for clustered standard errors by states. The substantive results
do not change.
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the interaction term in the first model is significant at the p < 0.01 level, suggesting the effect of
inequality does vary by the racial make-up of the state. Specifically, the effect of inequality on
public economic liberalism decreases by .05 for every unit increase in diversity. When the long-run
multiplier effect is fully accounted for, the total impact is -.07 (-.05/.67). Model 2 is identical to the
first but includes control variables that also shape public opinion, which due to data availability leads
to a shorter time series (1976-2014). The coefficient of the interaction term between inequality and
diversity also is statistically significant and negative.
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Table 2.2: Effect of State Inequality and Racial Diversity on Public Liberalism (1970-2014)
Dependent variable:
Economic Liberalism Social Liberalism
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Top 1 % 0.01∗∗ 0.01∗ 0.0004 0.001
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002)
Racial Diversity 1.39∗∗∗ 0.34 0.69∗∗∗
(0.35) (0.47) (0.19)
Racial Diversity ∆ 16.74
(10.50)
Economic Public Liberalism t−1 0.67∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Economic Policy Liberalism -0.01 -0.03
(0.02) (0.02)
Unemployment Rate -0.0003 -0.0002
(0.01) (0.01)
Average Income (log) 0.17 0.26∗∗
(0.11) (0.11)
Log Population (log) 0.30∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.07)
Percent Democrat 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
Percent Union 0.005 0.002
(0.003) (0.003)
Social Public Liberalism t−1 0.97∗∗∗
(0.01)
Top 1% x Racial Diversity -0.05∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -0.002
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Top 1% x Racial Diversity ∆ -1.36∗∗
(0.67)
Constant -0.23∗ -6.78∗∗∗ -7.71∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗
(0.12) (1.57) (1.64) (0.07)
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,248 1,948 1,946 2,246
Adjusted R2 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.99
Residual Std. Error 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.13
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1, Results include regression coefficients and standard errors
in parentheses from OLS analyses. Durbin Watson tests for all models do not reject the null of
no autocorrelation.
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For clearer interpretation, I plot the estimated marginal effect from Model 2 and the 90%
confidence interval over the range of racial diversity in Figure 2.2. Higher values of racial diversity
indicate a state has more racial diversity. The solid sloping line in Figure 2.2 indicates how the
marginal effect of inequality on state public economic liberalism varies by racial diversity. The
confidence intervals around the line suggest the conditions under which increases in inequality have
a statistically significant effect on liberalism — they have a statistically significant effect whenever
the upper and lower bounds of the confidence interval are both above (or below) the zero line. The
dashes on the rug plot on the x-axis indicate observations. The figure suggests that for states whose
population is about .28 on the diversity scale or greater, the effect of inequality on economic public
liberalism is statistically significant and negative. On the other hand, when states are more racially
homogeneous (less than .08 on the diversity scale), the relationship between inequality and economic
public liberalism is significant and positive.
Notably, state-years that are .28 on the diversity scale constitute over 40% of the total number
of observations in this analysis. State-years that are under .08 on the diversity scale constitute less
than 20% of the total number of observations. In terms of the effect of inequality on the nation, this
imbalance should tip the scale— as a larger portion of states are higher on the diversity scale, there is
a greater likelihood for states to respond to inequality with less economic liberalism (as opposed to
more). This finding can help explain the forces that may be driving Kelly and Enns’ (2010) findings.
To gain a better handle on the substantive size of this effect, I take a deeper look at specific points
along the range of racial diversity. When states are the most homogeneous, a one-unit increase in the
percent of income held by the Top 1% leads to about a .01 unit increase in public economic liberalism.
Alternatively, when states are at the highest end of the diverse index, a one-unit increase in Top 1%
share results in over a .015 unit decrease in liberalism. To get a sense of the overall impact, note that
the observed range of Top 1% income share is 4 to 36%. When states are homogeneous, an increase
in inequality representing a shift from the bottom of its observed range to the top would produce a
.32 unit increase in public liberalism. On the other hand, when states are more racially diverse, a
shift in inequality from the bottom to the top of the range would produce a nearly .5 unit decrease.
These effects are sizable, given the range of public economic liberalism (-2.9 to 3.1). Overall, these
findings confirm expectations that as diversity rises, the less likely the mass public will respond to
increasing inequality with support for bigger government. In response to an increase in inequality,
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Figure 2.2: Conditional Effect of State Diversity on the Effect of Inequality on Public Economic
Liberalism
state publics with lower levels of diversity are more likely to want the government to do more. State
publics that have higher levels of diversity are in fact more likely to want government to do less.
The third model in Table 2.2 uses annual change in racial diversity (“Racial Diversity ∆”) as an
alternative indicator of diversity. The interaction term between Top 1% income share and diversity
change is statistically significant and negative, indicating that positive changes in racial diversity
lead to less liberalism. To illustrate this, the marginal effects plot is shown in Figure 2.3. States with
increases in diversity from the year before (higher values) respond to inequality with significantly
less liberalism.13
Could it be possible that rising racial diversity and inequality are not simply affecting attitudes
towards policies that target economic inequality, but are leading the public mood to shift toward
conservatism overall? To ensure that it is economic liberalism, and not all forms of liberalism, that
are being shaped by these two factors, I estimate the effect of inequality and diversity on public social
liberalism in the fourth model of Table 2.2. As anticipated, there is not a significant effect between
the interaction of inequality and diversity on social liberalism.14
13I also use 3 and 5 year windows for racial change and come to similar conclusions.
14Adding control variables, including social policy liberalism, does not change substantive results.
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Figure 2.3: Conditional Effect of State Diversity Annual Change on the Effect of Inequality on Public
Economic Liberalism
Next, I test if the interactive effect of racial diversity and inequality functions similarly for
preferences for welfare and education spending. In the first model, I show the results of the
interactive effect of state inequality and racial diversity on public support for welfare spending. The
second model is similar but uses education support as the outcome variable. Durbin-Watson tests for
both models indicated to reject the null of no autocorrelation. To account for serial correlation in the
error term, I estimated the same models using the Cochrane-Orcutt estimator, an iterative Generalized
Least Squares estimation procedure. The output of these models can be seen in Table 2.3. Durbin
Watson tests for both models 1 and 2 indicate we cannot reject the null of no autocorrelation.15
Similar to my earlier findings, the coefficient for the interaction term is negative and significant
at the p < 0.01 level. In the second model, when support for education spending is the outcome
variable, the coefficient for the interaction term is negative and statistically significant at the p < 0.1
level. Using the original regression models, I plot the estimated marginal effect of inequality and the
90% confidence interval over the range of racial diversity. The results are illustrated in Figure 2.4.
The figure tells a similar story: for states whose population is racially homogeneous, the effect of
inequality on welfare support is statistically significant and positive (Figure 3a). As racial diversity
rises, the public’s likelihood to respond with more support declines. I replicate the same analysis for
15Estimating both linear models using the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure did not affect the results substantively.
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Table 2.3: Effect of State Inequality and Racial Diversity on Public Support for Welfare and Education
Spending (1975-2000)
Welfare Support Education Support
(1) (2)
Top 1% 0.14∗∗∗ 0.01
(0.04) (0.05)








Education Spending Per Capita 0.95
(0.83)




State fixed effects Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 1,088 1,161
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1, Results include regression coefficients and standard errors
in parentheses from OLS analyses using Cochrane-Orcutt Estimation.
public education spending (Figure 3b). The slope and direction are similar to those produced from
other models. As predicted, the public’s preferences for education in response to inequality varies by
state racial diversity. However, the solid sloped line does not cross the line at 0, suggesting there
is no value of racial diversity at which the public responds to inequality with more preference for
education spending.
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(a) Welfare Support (b) Education Support
Figure 2.4: Conditional Effect of State Diversity on the Effect of Inequality on Support for Welfare
and Education Spending
Taken together, these results confirm my expectations. As inequality rises, states that are racially
diverse are more likely to respond by wanting the government to do less. This is true for economic
public liberalism as well as policy specific attitudes, although the size of the effect varies across
policy domains. Ultimately, though, the public’s response to inequality is conditional on racial
diversity.
2.3 State Diversity and Perceptions of “People like Us”
So far, this chapter has offered evidence to suggest that the effect of inequality on mass opinion has
been conditioned by racial diversity over time. I now turn to gain more purchase on the theorized
casual mechanism—that perceptions of other citizens as “people like me” vary by actual racial
diversity. To do so, I rely on the Perceptions of the American People Survey, administered by the
Ohio State University’s Center for Survey Research in the summer of 2002.16 Subjects were selected
through random-digit dialing and a total of 1,254 interviews took place. The advantage of this
original survey is that respondents were asked about their perceptions of group boundaries, including
if respondents felt a part of certain groups. In addition to questions concerning national identity,
16Survey data was provided by Elizabeth Theiss-Morse and is publicly available on Theiss-Morse’s website.
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subjects were asked about state boundaries. This allows for an empirical assessment of state racial
diversity on perceptions of others as “people like us.”
To measure state racial diversity, I include the same diversity measure used in the previous
analyses, which is calculated using percent white, black and other. I also estimate models using new
racial diversity measures based on higher quality data on race that the Census has collected in recent
years. This data categorizes people into one of four races (Asian or Pacific Islander, black or African
American, American Indian or Alaska Native, white) as well as ethnicity (Hispanic and non-Hispanic).
I recoded data so there were population estimates for one of five racial/ethnic categories: Hispanic,
non-Hispanic Asian or Pacific Islander, non-Hispanic Black or African American, non-Hispanic
American Indian non-Hispanic Alaska Native, and non-Hispanic White. These five groups were used
to compute diversity scores using the Herfindahl index. Using this same data, I also calculated state
diversity using a different categorization scheme that is more consistent with the original measure,
where data was recoded so that the three racial categories are non-Hispanic whites, non-Hispanic
blacks, and “other” (the sum of Hispanic, Asian or Pacific Islander and American Indian or Alaska
Native). Overall, this leaves me with 3 measures of racial diversity, that I refer to in this section as
Racial Diversity (Original), Racial Diversity (5 groups), Racial Diversity (3 groups).
The outcome variable is subjects’ response to the following item: “How strongly do you feel
part of, or identify with, people from your state?” Responses were coded from 1 to 7, where 1 means
they do not feel part of the group at all and 7 means they feel very strongly part of the group. At the
individual level, I include several control variables that may shape group identification (Theiss-Morse,
2009). This includes if the subject is native to the U.S. (0=non-native, 1=native), age, education
(coded from 1-4 where higher values indicate more education), party identification as a Democrat
or Republican (Independent was the excluded category), family income (re-scaled on a 1-5 scale
where higher values indicate higher income) and race (white, black and other).17 At the state level, I
include controls for logged state population, logged mean income, and percent Democrat.
Not unlike identification with the nation, Americans tend to feel part of the people living in
their state (Figure 2.5). But what factors predict how much of an attachment they feel to other state
17The use of the catch-all group “other” for coding race is unlike categories for whites and blacks in that
not all members of this category have the same racial or ethnic identification. However, there are too few
respondents within the “other” category to obtain accurate estimates by each racial/ethnic group. Further,
this categorization scheme is consistent with the rest of the analyses in the chapter.
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Figure 2.5: Respondents’ State Identity Strength
(Higher values indicate stronger identity strength.)
residents? The results of the regression analyses can be seen in Table 2.4. In the first model, I
estimate the effect of state diversity on respondents’ perceptions of feeling a part of their state for the
entire sample. According to theory, we would expect that as state diversity increases, people are less
likely to perceive their states’ population as “people like me.” And indeed this is what we find. The
regression coefficient for racial diversity is statistically significant (p < .01) and negative, where a
one-unit increase in racial diversity leads to a 1.85 decrease on the state identity scale, on average.
The second and third models include alternative diversity indicators that account for ethnicity and
different racial groups. Including these measures does lead to a smaller effect size of diversity on
identity, though the effect is still statistically significant. To get a better sense of the size of this effect,
consider that in 2002, the 5 group racial diversity index among states ranges from .06 to .65. The
coefficient on the diversity term in the third model (-.87) suggests that going from the least diverse
state to the most diverse results in over a .5 unit decline on the 7-point state identity scale. Overall,
this suggests when states are more racially diverse, state residents are less likely to feel they are a
part of the people in their state. This is the case when using the original diversity measure from the
previous analyses, as well as when using diversity measures that take into account more racial and
ethnic groups.
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Table 2.4: The Effect of State Racial Diversity on Feeling a Part the State
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Individual Level
Native-born 0.33 0.35 0.36
(0.27) (0.27) (0.27)
Age 0.07 0.06 0.06
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Democrat 0.35∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Republican 0.15 0.15 0.15
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Family Income -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Education -0.18∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
White -0.11 -0.14 -0.15
(0.15) (0.16) (0.16)
Black 0.05 -0.03 -0.04
(0.20) (0.20) (0.20)
State Level
Racial Diversity (Orig.) -1.85∗∗∗
(0.63)
Racial Diversity (3 group) -0.96∗
(0.50)
Racial Diversity (5 group) -0.87∗
(0.46)
Lg. Population 0.01 0.04 0.05
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
Lg. Mean Income -0.59 -0.61 -0.59
(0.46) (0.46) (0.47)
Percent Democrat 2.82∗ 1.15 1.18
(1.45) (1.29) (1.29)
Constant 10.93∗∗ 11.27∗∗ 11.02∗∗
(4.68) (4.76) (4.80)
Observations 1,044 1,044 1,044
Adjusted R2 0.03 0.03 0.03
Residual Std. Error 1.61 1.61 1.61
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1 Note: Results include regression
coefficients and standard errors in parentheses from OLS analyses. Data
come from The Perceptions of American People Survey (2002).
Individual-level data allows us to examine how a state’s racial make-up affects members of
different racial groups. Instead of using the racial diversity scale as a measure of racial make-up,
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the models in Table 2.5 use the percent of the state that is in a different racial category than white
and black respondents. Notably, the small number of minority respondents in this sample leads to
substantial decline in statistical power. In states that have higher proportions of blacks and American
Indians/ Alaskan Natives, whites are significantly less likely to feel a part of their state (Model
1). Blacks’ sense of state identity does not appear to be significantly affected by the percent of
non-blacks in the state (Model 2). In Model 3, I estimate the same regression using respondents
that identified with a racial or ethnic group other than blacks or whites. Respondents’ sense of state
identity is only significantly affected by the percent of blacks in their state, where they are less likely
to feel a part of their state as the proportion of blacks in their state increases. However, there is no
statistically significant effect for the proportion of whites in a state on state identity strength for those
who are neither white nor black.
Table 2.5: The Effect of Racial Group Proportions on Feeling a Part the State
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(Whites Only) (Blacks Only) (“Others” only)
Percent Black -0.02∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.03)
Percent White -0.01 -0.003
(0.02) (0.01)
Percent Latino 0.01 0.02
(0.01) (0.04)
Percent Asian/Pacific Islander -0.02 -0.12
(0.03) (0.11)
Percent Indian/Alaskan Native -0.29∗∗∗ -0.50
(0.07) (0.76)
Observations 849 95 100
Adjusted R2 0.03 0.12 0.21
Residual Std. Error 1.50 1.73 1.98
Note: Results include regression coefficients and standard errors in parentheses from OLS analyses.
Data come from The Perceptions of American People Survey (2002). Includes controls for state
population, average income and proportion democrat, as well as respondent’s age, partisanship, family
income, education level and if they are native to the U.S.
These results provide some suggestive evidence for the individual causal mechanism I propose
is driving the relationship between inequality, diversity and political preferences— empathy with
others. When states are more racially diverse, state residents are less likely to feel they are a part
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of the people in their state. However, whites in particular appear to be the most susceptible to
the effects of a non-white population. Consistent with recent scholarship (Abrajano and Hajnal,
2017), this suggests that whites may be the driving force behind shifts in aggregate opinion towards
economic conservatism. However, higher quality data with over-samples of non-white groups would
be beneficial in further exploring how racial diversity shapes feelings of “people like us.”
2.4 Discussion
While scholars have recently made important strides in identifying how the American public has
responded to rising inequality, the objective of this study was to offer a deeper understanding of
why citizens respond in the way they do. My explanation is built on the notion that rising economic
inequality can lead to anxiety and increases the propensity for social comparison. Under such
conditions, people will engage in discriminatory behavior, preferring to help others that they see
as more like themselves and even less likely to help others perceived as not like them. Thus our
response to inequality hinges upon if we perceive other citizens as “people like us.” While this
pattern has been identified at the individual level through experiments, this study explores its macro
political implications. As inequality has risen dramatically over the decades, simultaneously so has
rising racial diversity, decreasing the likelihood we empathize and perceive of others as people like
ourselves. Ultimately, as diversity increases, the public is less likely to respond to rising inequality
by supporting policies that equalize economic resources to help the “have-nots.” This has important
implications: public opinion ultimately shapes policies that either keep the status quo or help produce
more inequality, contributing to a cycle of self-reinforcing inequality (Kelly, 2020).
The findings from this study suggest the relationship between inequality and mass preferences
is conditioned by subnational racial diversity. When states are more diverse, there is a weaker
perception that the citizenry is composed of “people like us,” and in turn citizens on average are
less willing to support equalizing policies in response to inequality. However, when states are less
racially diverse, the public is more likely to share a common social identity. In turn, they are more
likely to empathize with others as people like themselves and thus more likely to support government
intervention to help others. My findings also indicate that diversity not only has this effect when
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measured in levels, but also when we consider annual changes in diversity, consistent with recent
scholarship (Hopkins, 2009, 2011).
This research contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it demonstrates that public
opinion is responsive to changing economic conditions at the subnational level, in line with recent
research (Franko, 2016; Franko and Witko, 2017). However, public responsiveness to state-level
inequality is not absolute. Racial diversity conditions the effect of rising inequality on redistributive
policies. This finding may also shed light on why scholars have come to conflicting conclusions when
studying the public’s response to inequality at different units of analysis, where rising inequality
leads to demand for greater redistribution at state level (Franko, 2016), but leads to less support for
redistribution nationally (Kelly and Enns, 2010). Inequality can be met with increasing support for
redistribution under certain conditions. But as these conditions (racial homogeneity) have become
increasingly rare over the past few decades, we inevitably see weaker mass support for redistribution.
Second, though these results are supported by an influential literature suggesting social het-
erogeneity poses challenges to government spending (Stichnoth and Van der Straeten, 2013), this
study identifies the impact of subnational racial diversity on aggregate opinion towards redistribution.
Thus, this study offers evidence for the mechanism usually implied but rarely tested in studies of
diversity and policy output: mass preferences. Based on these analyses, public opinion is likely one
of the driving factors that has led to limited government spending in the U.S. Further, although the
racialization of welfare through elite framing is well-documented, this chapter addresses how race
plays a role in shaping public opinion on a wide range of policies that effectively reduce economic
inequality. Recall that despite the fact that public funding of education is significantly more popular
among voters than other forms of downward redistribution (McCall, 2013), support for increased edu-
cation spending has plateaued since the 1980s. My research offers one explanation as to why: public
education, and potentially other policies, are likely to become more subject to racial considerations
as the nation continues to become increasingly diverse.
Following prior scholarship that finds people pick up on their racial context (Wong, 2007;
Newman et al., 2015), I have argued that the public is able to perceive differences in the magnitude
of racial diversity in their states and this shapes perceptions of other citizens as “people like us.”
When states have higher proportions of people that are not in their own racial group, they are less
likely to identify with the people of the state. However, more work still is to be done to form a deeper
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understanding of the extent to which these perceptions vary across geographic units and what source
of information informs these perceptions over time.
Finally, my theory suggests that a decline in empathy is the causal link between rising inequality,
racial diversity and public opinion. In the next chapter, I investigate further how inequality may
decrease individuals’ empathy toward other racial groups.
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CHAPTER 3: THE ROLE OF EMPATHY
In 2006, Barack Obama told graduating seniors in a university commencement ceremony that
“there’s a lot of talk in this country about the federal deficit, but I think we should talk more about
our empathy deficit—the ability to put ourselves in someone else’s shoes; to see the world through
those who are different from us — the child who’s hungry, the laid-off steelworker, the immigrant
woman cleaning your dorm room.” In the previous chapters I have made the claim that it is this sort
of empathy gap among citizens that plays an important role in understanding the public’s perplexing
response to rising inequality. Inequality arouses anxiety and perceptions of scarcity, and in such
contexts we are more likely to help others who are like us and refuse help to others who are not.
But why is empathy important? And how might economic inequality and anxiety contribute to this
empathy deficit?
In the previous chapter, I demonstrate that as racial diversity increases, the less likely the mass
public responds to increasing inequality by supporting bigger government. In this chapter, I focus
on the micro-level processes that help drive the patterns we see at the macro level. Specifically, I
explore the individual level mechanism through which I argue inequality, race and policy preferences
in America are connected—empathy.
Theoretically, I have argued that economic inequality can lead to feelings of economic anxiety.
When individuals are in contexts where this sort of anxiety or distress is heightened, this should lead
people to be less inclined to empathize with outgroups. Here I test how economic anxiety can shape
the degree to which whites empathize with racial minority groups. Specifically, I use the economic
crisis spurred by the coronavirus pandemic to leverage variation in economic distress. Using original
survey data, I test how personal economic situations that incite anxiety, including unemployment or
loss of business during the pandemic, shape whites’ empathy with blacks, Asians and Latinx people.
I find that whites who are in conditions that should produce the most economic anxiety express less
empathy for all three groups. However, this effect is only found among low income whites, those
who are most economically vulnerable. I also find that empathy with racial outgroups significantly
shapes attitudes toward government social safety net measures. This micro level analysis supports
my argument that economic anxiety can in fact shape how citizens empathize with citizens not like
themselves, which has important implications for their political preferences.
3.1 What is Empathy and Why Does it Matter?
Conceptually, empathy can involve the capacity to identify with others, but also can include the
extent to which one is affected by and shares the emotional state of another (De Waal, 2008). In this
chapter, I focus on the latter, which is also one of most widespread conceptions of the term (Simas
et al., 2020). Empathic concern is defined as the tendency to experience other-oriented emotions,
such as sympathy or compassion, for what others are experiencing. This individual trait is strongly
associated with individuals’ desire to help others. For example, those high in empathy are more
likely to help even strangers, such as through volunteering or giving to charity (Unger and Thumuluri,
1997; Cialdini et al., 1997).
Research from psychology on empathy has traced it to our evolutionary roots. Empathy de-
veloped over time as an important tool for managing social interactions, including facilitating
communication and cooperation within large groups. But there is a caveat. People tend to exhibit
more empathy toward those who are more similar to them than they are to those who are different
(De Waal, 2008). This empathy bias likely developed as a way to regulate cooperation with outgroups,
where one punishes outgroup members who fail to reciprocate (Batson and Ahmad, 2001). Zaki
(2014) suggests that indiscriminate empathy toward outgroups, particularly during times of intergroup
conflict or when resources are limited, can come at a cost. Given that people are more likely to have
compassion for ingroup members, this empathy gap between “us” and “them” neatly aligns with the
fact that people tend to have favoritism towards those in their ingroup over those in outgroups (Tajfel
and Turner, 1986).
There is strong evidence that in the context of redistributive preferences, Americans are less
likely to support policies when they are perceived to help members of racial outgroups (Winter,
2006; Gilens, 1999; Luttmer, 2001). But political scientists have paid substantially less attention
to group empathy—the potential intermediary between the two. Recently, Sirin et al. (2016) find
that group empathy is an important driver of immigration attitudes among whites, blacks and Latinx
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people.1 Using survey experiments, the authors find that the degree to which individuals express
empathy toward other racial and ethnic groups shapes how strongly they support helping a detained
undocumented immigrant who is a racial other.2
Historically, humans have relied on empathy to help facilitate intergroup cooperation, but also
for managing intergroup conflict, offering a protective measure when in potentially threatening
situations. Thus the expression of empathy can vary by contextual cues, as people are more likely to
respond to outgroups with hostility when under conditions of threat. One of the mediating factors in
this phenomenon is anxiety— threat can lead to anxiety, and when anxiety is triggered, people can
respond less positively to outgroups (Brader et al., 2008; Christiani, 2020).
When considering Americans’ empathy toward others, we should expect that economic condi-
tions play some part. As described in the first chapter, thinking about inequality leads to feelings
of anxiety (Condon and Wichowsky, 2020). Contexts that signal people to be economically anx-
ious make it more unlikely people will empathize with outgroups. Given that empathy is one of
the strongest factors in shaping peoples’ willingness to help others, understanding the causes and
consequences of empathy should be particularly helpful for explaining redistributive preferences.
Using several experiments, Arceneaux (2017) finds that anxiety exacerbates a racial empathy
gap, where when whites were made to be anxious, they felt less empathy for and were less supportive
of helping African Americans. Arcenaeux’s findings are complemented by recent experimental work
in political science that examines the implications of economic anxiety (Condon and Wichowsky,
2020).3 I apply this framework to the context of racial group empathy and real world economic
conditions.
In the following pages, I directly test my expectation that contexts that increase economic
anxiety shape how individuals empathize with racial outgroups. I examine how conditions that
presumably highlight economic inequality and induce anxiety — specifically, unemployment or loss
1The authors note the significant impact of empathy on immigration attitudes does not diminish even when con-
trolling for as political trust, partisanship, authoritarianism, social dominance orientation and ethnocentrism,
in addition to a range of demographic controls.
2Interestingly, blacks have more liberal attitudes toward immigration policy than whites despite the fact
that they experience larger direct material threats and competition from immigrants, particularly Latinx
immigrants. The authors explain this gap by showing blacks are particularly empathic toward minority groups
that also experience racial discrimination. Clearly, empathy matters.
3In unpublished research, Jon Kuk finds that inducing non-white Americans to think about a financially
distressful situation leads to higher levels of racial resentment.
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of business during an unprecedented worldwide pandemic — shape the expression of racial group
empathy among whites. As described in earlier chapters, race is one of the dividing lines in American
social and political life, and thus looking at empathy toward other racial groups is crucial. In this
chapter, I focus exclusively on white attitudes. I expect that whites consider racial minority groups
as distinct outgroups, making them useful for my purposes. This assumption is supported by my
results discussed in Chapter 2, where I find that as the proportion of racial minorities increases in a
state, whites’ feelings that others in the state are like them declines. Moreover, compared to whites,
members of different racial minority groups may be more likely to feel a sense of shared identity or
linked fate with each other. For example, blacks express a sense of commonality with Latinx people,
which is rooted in the belief that they share experiences of racial discrimination and are in similar
positions in the U.S. racial hierarchy (McClain et al., 2006; Sirin et al., 2016). Looking at whites’
responses to racial outgroups is also beneficial for my purposes in that we know that historically,
how whites feel about racial outgroups is strongly indicative of their attitudes toward redistribution
(Gilens, 1999; Fox, 2004; Kam and Kinder, 2012).
3.2 Survey Design
The findings for this chapter come from a national survey fielded in June of 2020 in the U.S.
Respondents were an opt-in panel recruited online by the survey firm Qualtrics. The survey consisted
of approximately 2,400 respondents. Respondents were recruited to match national distributions on
gender, age, education, income and race. The descriptive statistics for respondent demographics are
provided in Table 3.1. I subset my analysis to white respondents only (n = 1348).
Gender is coded dichotomously where 1=male and 0 = female (sample included 1098 males).
Age was measured on a 9-point scale ranging from 1 (less than 18 years of age) to 9 (85 years or
older). Party identification is a 7-point scale ranging from strong Democrat (1) to strong Republican
(7). Similarly, ideology ranges from very liberal to very conservative on a 5-point scale. The median
respondent is an Independent and an ideological moderate. Education corresponds to the highest
level of education completed by the respondent. A value of 1 indicates an education level of 9th
grade or less, while a value of 8 indicates a professional degree (JD, MD). Household annual income
is measured on a scale ranging from 1 (less than $10,000) to 12 ($150,000 or more).
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics of Sample: Demographics and Political Leanings
Variable Min Max Median Mean SD
Education 1 8 5 5.50 1.71
Income 1 12 7 6.89 3.48
Age 2 9 5 4.88 1.72
Ideology 1 5 3 2.97 1.14
Party ID 1 7 3 3.56 2.28
The four items below were asked about government downward redistribution. These items focus
on government efforts to help needy people in general. For each item, respondents indicated their
level of agreement on a 7-point scale from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” Higher values
indicate the respondent is more supportive of government’s role in providing a strong social safety.
The responses to these four items were combined into an additive scale.
• The government should help more needy people even if it means going deeper into debt.
• It is the government’s responsibility to take care of people who can’t take care of themselves.
• The government should help pay for healthcare for people who cannot afford to pay for it themselves
because they are too sick or too poor.
• The government should provide unemployment benefits that allow people to maintain a good standard
of living.
3.2.1 Racial Group Empathy
To measure outgroup empathy, I asked respondents about their concern for specific racial/ethnic
groups. This measure is based on the group empathy battery created by Sirin et al. (2016), who
modified Davis’s (1983) measures of empathic concern to specifically measure feelings of empathy
for racial minority groups. Respondents were asked “for each of the following specific groups, how
concerned do you feel about the challenges they face in our society these days?” Using a 5-point
scale ranging from not at all concerned to very concerned, subjects indicated their level of concern for
each of the following racial groups: African Americans, Asians and Latinos/Hispanics. Descriptive
statistics for these variables are shown in Table 3.2 and frequency distributions are illustrated in
Figure 3.1. On average, whites felt the most concern for blacks. Notably, this survey was fielded
between June 10-19, 2020, during which widespread protest against anti-black racism and police
brutality persisted across the U.S., It is likely that historically, this level of concern for blacks may
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be relatively high. However, looking at attitudes toward groups other than blacks helps establish
that the patterns I find in public opinion is not just an artifact of heightened concern for blacks more
generally.
Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics of Racial Group Empathy
Variable Min Max Median Mean SD N
Blacks 1 5 4 3.52 1.32 1346
Latinx 1 5 3 3.22 1.26 1343
Asians 1 5 3 3.03 1.25 1340
Includes only white respondents.
Figure 3.1: Frequency Distribution of Racial Group Empathy Among Whites
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In order to isolate the specific effect that empathy has apart from racial attitudes, I include two
racial attitudes scales. One of the most widely used measures is the racial resentment scale, which
aims to tap a slightly more subtle form of anti-black prejudice where blacks are perceived as not
working hard enough and taking what they have not earned (Kinder and Sanders, 1996).
• The Irish, Italians, Jews and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks
should do the same without any special favors.
• Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for Blacks to
work their way out of the lower class.
• It is really a matter of not trying hard enough; if Blacks would only try harder they could be just as well
off as Whites.
• Over the past few years, Blacks have gotten less than they deserve.
This survey also included recently developed racial attitudes measure, the Fear, Institutionalized
Racism, and Empathy (FIRE) scale, by DeSante and Smith (2019), who aim to better capture racism
in public opinion the 21st century.
• White people in the U.S. have certain advantages because of the color of their skin.
• Racial problems in the U.S. are rare, isolated situations
• I am fearful of people of other races.
• I am angry that racism exists.
Both racial resentment and the FIRE measure were measured on a 5-point scale, where higher
values indicate more racism. The items for each scale were combined into an additive scale.
Descriptive statistics for these two racial attitude measures are shown in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics of Sample: Racial Attitudes
Variable Min Max Median Mean SD
Racial Resentment 1 5 3 2.81 1.15
FIRE 1 5 3 2.90 0.62
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3.2.2 Economic Distress: COVID-19
To identify the consequences of the experience of real economic threats, I look to respondents’
personal economic situations. The survey I rely on in this chapter was intended to measure peoples’
social and political attitudes during the coronavirus pandemic. The highly contagious virus lead
to mass shutdowns throughout the globe. In late March, many local and state government in the
U.S. began enforcing stay-at-home orders and the closures of most businesses. The pandemic has
caused substantial social and economic disruption, including the largest recession since the Great
Depression. By June of 2020, nearly 40 million Americans had applied for unemployment checks.
In the beginning of the pandemic, some originally dubbed the virus, which can essentially infect
anyone, as the “great equalizer.” In March, New York Governor Andrew Cuomo told reporters
that “everyone is subject to this virus. I don’t care how smart, how rich, how powerful you think
you are.” However, the way the pandemic in the following months actually played out indicated
it was far from non-discriminatory. In addition to wide disparities in health outcomes arising on
lines of race and class, the pandemic’s economic impact only exacerbated the country’s already high
levels of income inequality. Many low-wage workers in service or blue-collar jobs were laid off,
pushing many of the economic burdens of the crisis onto the losers of today’s polarized economies
and labor markets. While the fallout from the virus has led to layoffs and hits to businesses that have
affected the financial situation of those across the economic stratum, this crisis will (and already has)
undoubtedly shatter the lives of the most vulnerable on the economic ladder.
As can only be expected, Americans are anxious. A Marketplace-Edison Research Poll found
that nearly one-third of Americans say they are losing sleep over their current financial situation and
levels of economic anxiety have sky-rocketed. To assess the effect of anxiety on group empathy, I
leverage individual variation in economic situations. Respondents were asked about their current
work status and could select one of the following options: working outside the home (in person),
working from home, unemployed due to coronavirus, unemployed (not due to coronavirus), lost
some to all of business (due to coronavirus), lost some to all of business (not due to coronavirus),
student, retired or other. Descriptive statistics for white respondents’ work status are shown in Table
3.4.
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Table 3.4: Descriptive Statistics of Work Status
Work Status N Percent
Working outside the home, in person 336 24.9%
Working from home 316 23.4%
Unemployed due to coronavirus 86 6.4%
Unemployed, not due to coronavirus 94 7.2%
Lost some to all of business due to coronavirus 29 2.2%




Responses were recoded into a dichotomous variable, economic distress, where 1 = unemployed
or lost some/all of business (for any reason) and 0 = no economic distress (all else). In total, 213
respondents are considered to be in the “economic distress” condition and 1135 are not. The country
is collectively facing dark economic times, and this is certainly the case for many students and even
people who have not lost their jobs. However, those who currently are unemployed or have taken
hits to their businesses during the worst economy of our lifetime should be feeling the higher levels
of economic anxiety, on average. This should particularly be the case for those who already are in
low-income households.
Using the coronavirus pandemic as leverage to vary economic distress offers a kind of natural
experiment, in which the usually slow moving and relatively rare indicators of economic distress are
replaced by a large scale and temporary phenomenon that should be considerably more powerful.
Enhanced variation on economic distress here provides a much more powerful effect than the standard
economic highs and lows Americans typically experience.
I have argued that the measurement of individual economic conditions in this way captures
variation in economic anxiety. Though this is not a perfect substitute for actual economic inequality,
I expect its effect should mirror rising inequality in that these individual economic experiences can
induce anxiety, insecurity and concern over scarce resources, consistent with related experimental
research (Krosch and Amodio, 2014; Condon and Wichowsky, 2020). In what follows, I use terms
like economic distress, economic anxiety, and poor/uncertain economic conditions synonymously.
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3.3 Findings
Table 3.5 reports results from multiple regression models predicting empathy with blacks, Latinx and
Asians among white respondents. I include controls for demographic characteristics and also other
dimensions of racial attitudes. Those who are higher on racial resentment and the FIRE scale (i.e.,
more racist), are less likely to empathize with blacks, Asians and Latinx people. For all three models,
I interact the binary economic distress variable with income. This allows me to look at if the effect
of unemployment or loss of business on empathy with minority groups varies by household income.
For the first two models, the interaction term between distress and income is positive and statistically
significant. For the third model, the coefficient estimate of the interaction term is similar to the first
two, but is not statistically significant.
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Table 3.5: Economic Distress and Racial Group Empathy among Whites
Dependent variable: Group Empathy
Blacks Latinx Asians
(1) (2) (3)
Economic Distress −0.33∗ −0.38∗∗ −0.43∗∗
(0.17) (0.18) (0.19)
Income 0.001 −0.01 −0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
FIRE scale −0.41∗∗∗ −0.38∗∗∗ −0.45∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Racial Resentment −0.56∗∗∗ −0.43∗∗∗ −0.31∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Party Identification −0.07∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Ideology −0.04 −0.09∗∗∗ −0.09∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Age 0.04∗∗ 0.03 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Male −0.22∗∗∗ −0.22∗∗∗ −0.22∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Education −0.01 0.01 −0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Economic Distress x Income 0.05∗∗ 0.04∗ 0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Constant 11.80∗∗∗ 10.78∗∗∗ 11.61∗∗∗
(0.72) (0.74) (0.78)
Observations 1,214 1,211 1,210
Adjusted R2 0.44 0.33 0.24
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1, Group empathy measure: “For each of the
following specific groups, how concerned do you feel about the challenges they face in
our society these days?” (1=not concerned at all, 5= very concerned)
To visualize this interactive relationship, for each of the three models (predicting empathy for
blacks, Latinx, and Asians), I plot the estimated marginal effect and the 90% confidence interval over
the range of income. These plots are shown in Figure 3.2. Higher values of income indicate higher
household income. The solid sloping line is the marginal effect of economic distress (unemploy-
ment/business loss) on group empathy across different household incomes. The confidence intervals
around the line suggest the conditions under which economic distress has a statistically significant
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effect on group empathy — they have a significant effect whenever both the upper and lower bounds
of the intervals are above or below zero line.
Figure 3.2: Marginal Effect (ME) of Economic Distress on Racial Group Empathy Across Income
Levels
The three plots indicate that among those with lower incomes, being unemployed or having
lost some of your business leads whites to have less empathy for black, Latinx, and Asian people.
The income threshold for significance varies somewhat between the three different models. But,
on average, those with incomes lower than a 7 on the scale (household incomes of $60,000 a year
or less) are less likely to empathize with racial outgroups when in economic distress. As income
declines, this negative effect of economic distress on empathy increases in magnitude. These effects
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are considerable. For example, among whites lowest on the income scale, being unemployed or
without business results in .4 unit decline in feelings of empathy toward Asians, a .3 unit decline for
Latinx people, and over a .25 unit decline for blacks (measured on a 5-point scale).
Among higher income whites who are also unemployed or have lost some to all of their business,
there is little to no effect on empathy toward minorities. However, for higher income whites, poor
employment circumstances lead them to become more empathetic toward blacks. Specifically, among
whites whose household annual income is $150,000 or more, facing unemployment or business loss
leads to a one-third point increase in empathy toward blacks, on average. I also estimate additional
models predicting different forms of racial attitudes (e.g., racial resentment). I find it is racial group
empathy in particular, not racial resentment, that declines as economic distress rises.
3.3.1 Matching Analysis
So far the analyses I have presented suggest whites are less likely to empathize with racial minority
groups when in bleak or uncertain economic states (i.e., conditions that most trigger anxiety). But, of
course, who is unemployed or has lost their business is not random. Moreover, standard regression
analyses help establish association, not necessarily causation.
To improve causal inference, I also rely on matching methods. Matching proceeds by identifying
a set of individuals in the “control” group who are similar to the individuals in the “treated” group
across all relevant characteristics. Then the difference in outcome between the control group and
the treated group will reflect the treatment effect. Here I rely on coarsened exact matching (CEM),
developed by Iacus et al. (2012), which requires fewer assumptions than other commonly used
matching methods.
Matching procedures often involve exact matching between treated and control groups on several
individual characteristics, which can produce an insufficient number of matches. With CEM, variables
are coarsened, meaning they are reduced to a small range of values based on thresholds defined by the
researcher. When covariates are coarsened, they are combined to create bins where all observations
in the same bin share the same values across the entire set of coarsened covariates. Coarsening each
characteristic like this allows for broader categories, leading to more potential matches. But these
categories still retain meaning. For example, age could be categorized into young, middle-age and
older adults. Once variables have been coarsened, a set of strata are created from the combination of
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these categories. Strata with at least one observation from both control and treated groups are used
for matching, meaning a matched pair has to match on all covariates.
Because the findings presented in the previous section indicate that the effect of economic
distress on racial group empathy depends on respondents’ income, I split my analysis into two
groups: low-income and high-income whites. Those in the low-income group make less than the
median income ($60,000) and high-income whites have household incomes of $60,000 or more. I
expect that for low income whites, economic distress should lead to less empathy for racial minority
groups, whereas for high-income whites there should be no effect. Recall that the economic condition
variable is a dichotomous variable coded 1 for economic distress (i.e., unemployment or business
loss) and 0 for no economic distress (all else). The distribution of this variable for low and high
income whites is provided in Table 3.6.
Table 3.6: Economic Condition among Low and High Income Whites
Work Status Low Income Whites High Income Whites
Economic Distress 129 84
No Economic Distress 474 661
To compare observations, I match them on variables that were found to be statistically significant
in predicting group empathy in the previous analyses: gender, ideology, racial resentment and the
FIRE scale. The 5-point ideology variable was coarsened into 3 categories (conservative, moderate
or liberal). Income in the survey was originally measured using a 12 point scale where 1= less
than $10,000 and 12=$150,000 or more. Thus the low income and high income group each have
6 categories (ranging from 1-6 in the low-income group and 7-12 in the high-income group). I
coarsened the six categories for each income group into three bins: low, medium and high. The
racial resentment scale was coarsened into 6 bins. Categories for the FIRE measure and gender were
unchanged.
Using the coarsened data, estimations were carried out with linear regression models.4 I estimate
the effect of economic distress on empathy for black, Latinx and Asian people, for both sets of
observations (high and low income), resulting in a total of 6 models. I kept my coarsening procedure
consistent for each model, and this yielded a high proportion of successful matches for all models.
4All matching analyses were conducted in R with the CEM package from Iacus et al. (2009).
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High-income group yielded 70 out of 77 total number of possible matches; low-income group yielded
110 out of 118 total number of possible matches on average.5 Even with coarsening, some imbalance
remained in the data. I adjust for this imbalance by adding covariates to the statistical model.6
The results of the models are shown in Table 3.7. This includes the Sample Average Treatment
Effect of the Treated (SATT) for low and high income whites. Consistent with my expectations,
unemployment or loss of business does not have a statistically significant effect among higher income
whites’ empathy towards blacks, Latinx, and Asian people.
Table 3.7: Effect of Economic Distress on Racial Group Empathy among Whites (CEM)
Income Group Blacks Latinx Asian
High Income 0.19 -0.01 -0.19
Whites [0.05, 0.43] [-0.27, 0.24] [-0.47, 0.07]
Low Income -0.18* -0.16 -0.30**
Whites [-0.38,.021] [-0.38, 0.05] [-0.54, -.06]
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1, Includes SATT point estimate
with 95% confidence intervals in brackets underneath. Group empathy
measure: “For each of the following specific groups, how concerned
do you feel about the challenges they face in our society these days?”
(1=not concerned at all, 5= very concerned)
As expected, I find that among low-income whites, the treatment has a negative and significant
effect on their feelings of concern toward blacks and Asians. While the SATT estimate for the
model predicting empathy for Latinx people is negative, it does not reach statistical significance
(p = .13). The effect sizes for models are consistent with the coefficient estimates in the earlier
analyses. Notably, of all three models, the estimate for empathy toward Asian people is the largest. It
is possible this effect is driven by the fact that COVID-19 originated in Asia and since has spread
around the globe. Once the virus hit American shores, this soon led to the targeting of Asians. For
example, in March 2020 President Donald Trump was quick to dub it the “Chinese virus.” Moreover,
anecdotal accounts indicate a rise in xenophobia and discrimination towards Asian Americans (Chiu,
5Because CEM requires that there are no missing data, the actual number of observations will vary a bit across
models.
6This is a suggestion from Iacus et al. (2012), who point out that “modeling assumptions for models applied
to the matched data are much less consequential than they would otherwise be because CEM is known to
strictly bound the level of model dependence.”
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2020; Jan, 2020). Thus, whites who are in particularly poor economic circumstances due to the
pandemic may be more likely to attribute the blame to China, or by default, Asian Americans.
However, collectively my results indicate that the poor economic circumstances have led whites to
feel less concern for all three racial outgroups.
3.3.2 Racial Group Empathy and Support for Bigger Government
I have also posited that empathy with others is the one of the keys to support for bigger government
(i.e., the expansion of government reach to equalize economic resources or help those who are less
fortunate). I estimate the effect of racial outgroup empathy on support for social safety net measures
using a series of regression models. The results of these models are shown in Table 3.8.
Each model estimates the effect of empathy toward a different racial/ethnic group (blacks, Latinx,
Asians). Controlling for demographic characteristics, political attitudes and other racial attitudes,
feelings of empathy toward all minority groups has a significant and positive effect on support for
a strong social safety net.7 These effects are substantial. Recall that the social safety net scale is
measured on a 1 to 7 scale and empathy is measured on a 5-point scale. This suggests that an increase
in empathy toward blacks going from the lowest to the highest range of the scale leads to almost an
entire point (.90) increase in safety net support (Model 1). The effect sizes are similar across all three
models.
3.4 Discussion
In 2008, when the U.S. housing market crashed and the country entered into what would be known as
the Great Recession, at the time the biggest recession since the Great Depression, many had hope for
a new era of redistributive politics. After all, millions of Americans lost their savings, unemployment
was near 10%, and this crisis was caused by the actions of those at the top of the economic ladder in a
weakly regulated financial industry. But we did not see a sustained, large scale shift in public demand
for redistribution and economic equality. What we did see was somewhat unexpected, including the
rise of the Tea party, a right wing movement almost exclusively composed of whites, and an increase
in public displays of racist rhetoric (Valentino et al., 2018).
7Model results excluding all controls are provided in the appendix.
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Table 3.8: The Effect of Racial Group Empathy on Support for Social Safety Net








Income −0.04∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
FIRE scale −0.47∗∗∗ −0.48∗∗∗ −0.47∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Racial Resentment −0.28∗∗∗ −0.29∗∗∗ −0.33∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Party Identification −0.08∗∗∗ −0.08∗∗∗ −0.08∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Ideology −0.25∗∗∗ −0.24∗∗∗ −0.24∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Age −0.05∗∗ −0.06∗∗ −0.05∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Male 0.08 0.09 0.08
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Education −0.05∗∗ −0.05∗∗ −0.05∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant 13.92∗∗∗ 14.13∗∗∗ 14.28∗∗∗
(0.98) (0.95) (0.96)
Observations 1,214 1,211 1,210
Adjusted R2 0.37 0.38 0.37
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Instead of a sustained coalition of voters that brought together the 99%, we saw the heightening
of racial divisions. The findings in this chapter help to explain why. Historically, as humans evolved,
they learned to refrain from empathizing with outgroups in situations of threat, or when resources
were limited (Zaki, 2014). The unprecedented economic crisis spurred by the COVID-19 offers
a useful context to study the consequences of extreme forms of economic threat or anxiety. This
context allowed me to identify the implications of real-world economic changes, testing the external
validity of experimental scholarship (Brader et al., 2008; Arceneaux, 2017).
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In an analysis of observational survey data, I find that when whites are in poor financial situations
that heighten economic anxiety, they respond by feeling less concern for others who are not like
themselves, including blacks, Asians and Latinx people. This pattern is found only among low-income
whites. Importantly, lower levels of empathy for outgroups significantly affects the willingness to
help others. Thus, my finding that economic anxiety leads to a decline in outgroup empathy among
low-income whites is consistent with scholarship demonstrating that low-income whites have been
resistant to bigger government in the face of rising inequality (Kelly, 2020; Cramer, 2016; Hochschild,
2018). I also provide evidence that empathy for racial outgroups is a key factor in explaining support
bigger government.
Should we expect this to be only a white phenomenon? This likely depends on what groups we
look at. On the one hand, economic anxiety could potentially increase group divisions among racial
minorities. This, for example, could be the case for Asian Americans’ attitudes toward blacks, who
have historically distanced themselves from the highly stigmatized group (Kim, 2000). However,
if certain minority groups already feel a stronger baseline sense of commonality or shared identity,
such as blacks’ feelings toward Latinx people (McClain et al., 2006), than the divisions between who
is “us” and “them” becomes more fuzzy.
In the previous two chapters I have made assumptions about how people view and respond to
inequality, as well as how this contributes to the ways in which they relate to other racial groups. In
the next chapters, I transition to a more inductive approach. I explore how social groups and empathy
shape the way Americans view inequality and redistribution, through their own words.
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CHAPTER 4: THE CASE FOR TALKING TO PEOPLE
In Chapter 2, I find that racial diversity plays a key role in the mass response to rising inequality.
Chapter 3 provides evidence for the mechanism I argue is undergirding this macro level pattern:
racial empathy. But as is often the case when we pool across observations, there are cases that don’t
fit as cleanly as our models would predict. Empirical methods also cannot always tell us why people
think the way they do. What is economic inequality? What are the signs of it and what does it look
like? How does it make one feel? How do the answers to these questions vary depending on who you
ask and where? Are there other important contributors to the formation of redistributive preferences
political scientists have yet to fully recognize? These are the sorts of questions that cannot be so
easily answered with close-ended survey questions, aggregated data and statistical models. The
simplest and most straightforward way, however, can be to have conversations with people and listen.
In this manuscript, I document several themes I came to discover during fieldwork in the spring
and summer of 2019. This fieldwork was conducted in two distinct regions: the Lowcountry, South
Carolina and Greenbrier Valley, West Virginia. In addition to one-on-one interviews and focus
groups, my research also involved immersion in the field, typical of standard ethnographic research.
Here I rely on an interpretive perspective, where the objective of this fieldwork was insight. What
have scholars of inequality maybe been missing when it comes to public opinion? I approached
this research as exploratory and inductive. My intention was not to test formal hypotheses, but to
gain deeper insight and understanding into public opinion by assessing key assumptions, identifying
important omitted variables and evaluating causal mechanisms. Before presenting my findings, in
this chapter I detail where, how and with whom I conducted my fieldwork research.
4.1 The Value of Listening
Just as scholars were beginning to use sample surveys as a way of understanding public opinion,
Blumer (1948) addressed the inherent deficiencies of the practice, cautioning social scientists not to
infer too much from a process that merely aggregates the opinions of disparate individuals. Although
random sample surveys have grown to become standard in the discipline, there are a variety of
techniques to assess public opinion. From salon forums to town halls to editorials, public opinion
expression can take on many shapes (Herbst, 1993). While mass sample surveys are useful in many
ways, they do not allow us to understand why people think the way they do.
Ethnographic and qualitative research is relatively sparse in the study of American public
opinion. However, for researchers that have adopted these methods, the insights they have offered
have been useful for both qualitative and quantitative scholars of American politics. An interpretive
methodological approach calls for scholars to take up the difficult task of “paying attention to the
social categories people find meaningful, as opposed to the categories we presuppose are important”
(Cramer, 2012, p. 532). Cramer (2012; 2016) aims to accomplish this by sitting in on dozens of
small gatherings of locals all over the state of Wisconsin for several years. Consider one of the
puzzles motivating Cramer’s research: why is it that “even the folks missing teeth rarely supported
government-sponsored health care reform” (p. 145)? Her ethnographic study of rural consciousness
offers a comprehensive, nuanced picture that helps scholars make more sense of such puzzles. In
contrast to other scholars who have suggested class consciousness is almost obsolete in America,
Cramer illustrates it does exist, albeit through the lens of place, in what she defines as “rural
consciousness.” She suggests rural residents define their in-group based on an amalgam of class,
place, and values, which leads to resentment of urban centers and political and economic elites.
Notably, when much of contemporary empirical political science came up short, it was interpretive
research such as Cramer’s that helped to foresee the surprising electoral success of Donald Trump,
the self-proclaimed anti-establishment, anti-elite candidate. Listening matters.
Recently, Condon and Wichowsky (2020) illustrate public attitudes toward inequality by col-
lecting responses from open-answered questions on online surveys taken by Americans all across
the country. They accomplish this by asking survey respondents to twice imagine the economic
“other” (whoever they imagine to be either a rich or poor person) and describe what they would say
to each person in an imagined conversation. The open-ended responses Condon and Wichowsky
(2020) provide reveal that among many Americans, there is a negative affect toward the poor who
are perceived as lazy, while the imagined rich are met with sometimes resentment, but oftentimes
admiration. Their innovative work highlights the critical role of social comparison in our concep-
tualization of inequality. Who we compare ourselves to, specifically whether we are looking up or
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down on the economic ladder, plays an important role in shaping demands for government action to
address inequality (Condon and Wichowsky, 2020).
My qualitative work is unique in a several respects. First, in my research I asked citizens to
describe who they perceive the others on the economic ladder to be — who are the haves and the have
nots? Second, my qualitative research involved immersion. Many of my interviews were conducted
in the familiar context of people’s own homes, places of work, or local hangouts. This allows me to
get a stronger sense of how the context of where Americans live plays a role in their understanding of
inequality and redistribution. Third, in contrast to being a bystanding listener, I guided conversations
by asking specific questions related to inequality and government. Because of this, my research does
not necessarily reflect the sorts of casual conversations people have in their day-to-day lives. Finally,
prominent qualitative scholarship examining attitudes toward economic inequality and government
has primarily focused on older whites (Hochschild, 2018; Cramer, 2016; Hochschild, 1981; Lane,
1962). In contrast, I widened the lens, talking to people with varied characteristics in regards to age,
rural/urban residence and race.
One intent of my qualitative research was to identify how Americans come to conceptualize
inequality, as well as identify what information they use to inform that understanding. To work
toward this goal, I rely on an interpretive framework. An interpretive approach implies the researcher
does not assume there is a widely shared meaning of objects, words or concepts. Alternatively, they
aim to understand how people make sense of their social and political world. They do not take the
meaning of concepts as given, and instead seek to discover how these concepts are understood in
everyday speech in certain contexts. Describing the benefits of interpretive ethnography in political
science, Wedeen (2010) states:
“Because meanings are cultural or socially available, they are replicable — in the sense
that some political scientists care about replication. Subsequent researchers can go
to the field, and even if they do not talk to the same people, they can nevertheless be
made aware of the range of meanings relevant to a particular phenomenon under study,
because meanings are socially, not simply individually, accessible.” (p. 265)
Indeed, several of the themes I come across in listening to people talk are strikingly consistent with
those illustrated in recent scholarship (Cramer, 2016; Hochschild, 2018; Condon and Wichowsky,
2020). So though qualitative research is not a match for the level of replicability afforded to
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quantitative research, this does not mean it lives in a vacuum, devoid of generalizability. It is telling,
and promising, that some of the trends I observed in public opinion in different corners of the country
are consistent with those identified in research independent from my own.
4.2 Case Study Design
My initial objective for fieldwork was provide insight into how the public response to inequality is
conditional on context. To this end, I conducted quasi-case studies of two different areas in the U.S.,
which primarily rely on evidence from qualitative interviews. But why conduct a case study? And
what cases are most fruitful? The meaning of case studies—which has been used in a variety of ways
in both quantitative and qualitative research—can be relatively ambiguous (Gerring, 2004; Seawright
and Gerring, 2008). Here I refer to a case study as an in-depth (qualitative and/or quantitative)
analysis of a sub-sample of units that can help draw inferences and offer insights about the larger
population. Importantly, I do not examine only cases that cleanly fit my theory.
4.2.1 Case Site Selection
So, where do we look? One route is to use statistical methods to identify cases that both meet and
defy a priori expectations. Using the same aggregate pooled data from Chapter 2, I estimated a
simple bivariate model predicting the effect of increasing inequality (Top 1% income share) on public
economic liberalism. To illustrate states’ varied response to an increase in inequality, I estimated the
random effects for each state in the model, shown in Figure 4.1. Values on the x-axis indicate random
slope values. Random coefficients and their respective 95% confidence intervals are then shown
for each state in red and blue lines. Positive estimates (blue) indicate that rising inequality leads to
more public liberalism and negative estimates (red) indicate rising inequality leads to less public
liberalism. A brief look at the figure shows there are many cases that intuitively fit the theory put
forth in Chapter 1. In states like Vermont, New Hampshire and Utah—very white states— residents
appear to respond to rising inequality with demand for more government. On the other hand, the
response of more racially diverse states, including Mississippi, Louisiana, and Oklahoma, is reversed:
inequality is met with less public support for redistributive measures.
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Figure 4.1: Effect of Inequality on Public Liberalism (State Random Effects)
Pooling across cases allows us to increase the variance of our analysis and gives us more
statistical power. But there are, of course, cases that don’t cleanly fit theory. According to the figure,
racially diverse states like New York, Illinois and California actually demand more government as
inequality rises. This could perhaps be due to some racial tipping point in diverse states, where
support from racial minorities (who are gradually becoming the majority) for redistribution outweighs
white opposition, moving the dial to the left. Though this story is plausible, members of various racial
and ethnic minority groups are not necessarily drastically more liberal in their policy preferences
than their white counterparts (Hajnal and Lee, 2011; Ashok et al., 2015). Importantly, there are also
cases that counter expectations in the opposite direction. For example, the coefficients illustrated in
Figure 4.1 indicate West Virginia, one of the most racially homogeneous (white) states in the U.S.,
appears to respond to inequality with less support for bigger government.
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While there are a variety of methods for case selection, I opted to examine a typical and a deviant
case. A typical case, also called an “onlier,” is representative of the relationship of interest found in
the larger share of the population (Seawright and Gerring, 2008). Typical case studies can largely
be confirmatory, representing a common case in the broader pool of cases, allowing researchers
to create an in-depth illustration of the broad causal relationship or phenomena being identified.
South Carolina, as a case that appears similar to many other cases (Figure 4.1) in regards to the
relationship of interest, fits this categorization nicely. The random coefficient for South Carolina, a
racially diverse state, is negative, which is consistent with my expectation that diverse areas respond
to inequality with less liberalism.
In contrast, a deviant case represents an outlier that challenges expectations. Deviant cases
can serve to be exploratory, helping researchers to better identify missing pieces to the puzzle they
are trying to explain. As indicated in the statistical analyses described earlier, West Virginia is a
standout state and is a fitting choice for a deviant case. Second only to Mississippi, West Virginia
has responded to increases in inequality with less liberalism. Despite being extremely racially
homogeneous, West Virginians have demanded less from government as inequality has risen in their
state. These two states (West Virginia and South Carolina) also had the added benefit of proximity to
my home institution in North Carolina.
To get a better understanding of the economic and demographic scope of both states, Figure
4.3 illustrates racial diversity, income inequality, and public liberalism over the past fifty years in
both South Carolina and West Virginia. Some key points are worth noting. First, both states have
experienced relatively little demographic change, but West Virginia is consistently more racially
homogeneous (95% white on average) compared to South Carolina, which has remained about 70%
white over the past five decades. Second, similar to the rest of the country, income inequality has
steadily risen in each state since the 1970s. However, it appears that from the mid-1990s onwards,
South Carolina’s income concentration among the top earners has surpassed that of West Virginia’s.
Finally, on average, public opinion in both states has grown less liberal over time; though before the
mid-1990s, West Virginians were more liberal than South Carolinians.
Within these states, I focused on two regional areas: New River/Greenbrier Valley, West Virginia
and the Lowcountry, South Carolina. In both of these areas, there is substantial variation both within
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(a) Herfindahl Index (b) Percent White
Figure 4.2: Racial Diversity in West Virginia and South Carolina
(a) Top 1% Income Share (b) Public Economic Liberalism
Figure 4.3: Inequality and Public Opinion in West Virginia and South Carolina
and between, allowing me to compare areas with substantially different demographic and economic
characteristics.
4.2.2 Objectives
The primary goal of my fieldwork in these sites was to develop insight into public opinion on issues
of inequality in various settings through talking to ordinary people. Specifically, qualitative research
offers me the opportunity to assess critical assumptions, identify omitted variables and evaluate
causal mechanisms. Gerring (2004) notes that case studies usually perform a double function: they
are often studies of the unit itself, as well as case studies of a broader class of units. Therefore, for
each of my objectives, I keep these functions in mind, considering how information specific to each
case informs our understanding of the case as well as the implications for the nation.
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In Chapter 2, I make some key assumptions. For one, I posited that state contexts can shape
public opinion. The choice to use states as the unit of analysis was informed by a growing literature
of the role of states in shaping political attitudes (Franko and Witko, 2017; Franko, 2017; Macdonald,
2019; Ebeid and Rodden, 2006). However, one of my goals for fieldwork was to explore how context
matters (or does not matter) for public opinion towards government spending on inequality targeting
measures. While states are used as a useful point of variation for empirical observational analyses, it
is unlikely they are an exclusive reference point that shapes public liberalism. In other words, trends
in inequality and diversity at the national, state, and local levels may very all well shape opinion.
This concept is similar to the marble cake analogy of federalism, where there is a mixing of influence
at local, state and national levels. Revealing if and how context matters for public opinion is a key
objective for this case study. Another goal was to identify other important factors that shape attitudes
toward inequality and redistribution. According to my theory, we would expect West Virginia to be
more economically liberal than it currently is given that the population is almost entirely white. So,
what else is going on? I have posited that a decline in empathy between citizens is the causal link
between rising inequality/diversity and public opinion. I approached fieldwork with the intention
of exploring potential explanations for the decline in public liberalism, including but not limited to
empathy with others (whether they may be racial outgroups or not).
4.3 In the Field: Methodology
Fieldwork research was conducted in two main regions: the Lowcountry, South Carolina (January-
March 2019) and New River/Greenbrier Valley, West Virginia (April - June 2019). My findings come
from in-person formal (audio-recorded) interviews, informal conversations and observations, and
focus groups conducted during fieldwork. Participants were recruited through advertisements on
Craigslist, community pages on Facebook, connecting with family/friends of those I knew, and word
of mouth. I also contacted local figures who are active in various communities within the area and
asked them to share an email advertisement with their friends, churches, and neighborhood networks.
While such methods, of course, do not lead to representative samples of state publics, the purpose
of my qualitative research is insight—to enrich our understanding of public opinion towards these
topics by gathering individual stories of ordinary people.
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My formal interviews took place at people’s place of work, where they lived, or in public settings
(e.g., fast-food restaurants). In addition to questions on political positions and personal economic
circumstances, some of the types of questions I asked are below.
• How is the place you live now different from 10, 20, 30 years ago? Explain.
• To what extent, if any, do you feel like everyone is on the same level playing field, or that
others have distinct (economic) advantages?
• Do you see the gap widening between those who have the most and those who have the least?
• How do you know there are differences/inequality? Can you give me an example?
• How do you think the rich/poor got to where they are?
• Should government do more to narrow economic differences?
• What are racial relations like here?
In-depth interviews are centered on discursive and dialectical conversations with interviewees
(Soss, 2015). To this end, in my formal interviews I used a dynamic method that promotes flexibility.
This led me to sometimes shift the types of terminology I used varied from the items listed above.
For example, “inequality” was rarely a common term in people’s vernacular. My objective in these
interviews was to allow participants to define who the haves and have-nots are and then make their
judgments based on their own perceptions. This sometimes meant steering clear of certain types
of language or frameworks. My interviews allowed me the chance to acquire an in-depth sense of
interviewees’ conceptualization inequality and redistribution, but also get a sense of their unique
background, values, and perspectives.
Focus groups, on the other hand, were useful in that they allowed me to explore opinions in
environments in which social pressure and social dynamics are at work. In other words, they help to
better incorporate the truly “public” part of public opinion. The groups were organized in an attempt
to maximize intra-group homogeneity on racial and class lines. Prior to a focus group, all participants
were required to fill out a confidential questionnaire where they were able to indicate their race, age,
income, and political predispositions. Focus groups were held at a centrally located building in rooms
specifically designed for focus group facilitation. In exchange for participation, all participants were
offered a cash honorarium. For more details on interview and focus group facilitation, see appendix.
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Importantly, the content of my interviews must be considered in the broader social dynamics
in which they take place. I am white, female, originally from the American south and a political
scientist. This undoubtedly shaped the content of my discussions.
In West Virginia, I conducted formal semi-structured interviews with 22 people. In South
Carolina, I conducted one-on-one interviews with 4 people and held 2 separate focus groups (10
people) for a total of 14 people. All of these interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed. All
names and some identifying characteristics have been changed. There were several times where
people declined to be audio-recorded but allowed me to take notes during our conversations. In
addition to these personal discussions, I also spent time going to local political events, networking,
having casual conversations with people in the area, as well as taking photographs and documenting
observations of places I went to. Thus, in addition to transcribed interviews, my findings are also
drawn from the extensive field notes I took while I was traveling. To analyze the qualitative data,
I read through all of the materials I collected and used the software platform Atlas.ti to code for
overlapping themes across regions and demographic groups. In the next chapter, I present my findings
from these analyses.
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CHAPTER 5: SEEING DIFFERENCE: ECONOMIC DISPARITIES IN CONTEXT
In the following pages, I provide a brief history and description of the two regions where I con-
ducted fieldwork: New River/Greenbrier Valley (WV) and the Lowcountry (SC). These illustrations
help place the content of my interviews in context. I then focus on distinct patterns in residents’
conceptions of economic disparities. During fieldwork, I quickly came to realize that understandings
of inequality are heavily interwoven with how one feels about those perceived economic conditions.
Thus, the patterns I describe are based on both how people see (or don’t see) disparities as well as
their personal beliefs surrounding those perceptions, including the role of government in addressing
inequities. The insights from this work were often found through the lens of empathy, including
one’s capacity to see others as people like themselves, as well as feelings of concern or compassion
(or lack therof) for another’s misfortunes.
Recall that West Virginia was selected as a case study because it challenges theoretical expecta-
tions. Despite the fact that the state is highly racially homogeneous, as inequality has risen, West
Virginians have simultaneously moved further to the right over time. Through my interviews in
the state, I observed several examples of an empathy gap, though not exactly in the form of racial
empathy that is described in previous chapters. Unlike some racially diverse areas, West Virginia’s
poor are almost entirely composed of whites. Given the state’s high level of racial homogeneity,
internal racial divisions were fare less salient than class-based divisions. Among many of those
I talked to, the “have-nots” were often characterized as lazy, complacent and greedy. The opioid
epidemic seems to have made many West Virginians particularly unsympathetic toward the poor,
resulting in less support for stronger government social safety nets. Unlike those I talked to in South
Carolina, drug use was mentioned in almost every single interaction I had with West Virginians,
particularly when folks discussed who was deserving of help and who was not. During fieldwork, I
also found that among low and middle income residents, class comparisons were seldom directed at
those at the very top. Rarely did I hear about frustration or resentment toward the richest of the rich,
or the top 1%. Rather, people focused on those much closer to themselves on the economic ladder,
who were often perceived as more direct competitors for economic resources.
In South Carolina, discussion of economic disparities felt markedly different. Interviewees
expressed frustration with newcomers in the area in terms of race or origin but also in terms of
class. Wealth and privilege were strong themes in these discussions, where residents who are already
considerably well off compared themselves to yacht owners or millionaires. The increasing presence
of newcomers to the region also highlighted the sense of difference people felt — are they people
like us? — when comparing themselves to other residents. In addition to a large focus on outsiders
moving into the region, I observed that those I talked to in South Carolina personally experienced
significantly more geographic mobility than those in West Virginia. This led to a much broader
discussion of inequality that extended beyond regional and state borders.
After comparing my interviews and field notes in the two states, I have a couple of initial
takeaways. First, geography matters. Place matters. Peoples’ conceptions of inequality are shaped
not only by where they live, but also their own personal history (e.g., places they have lived or
traveled to). Geographic mobility allows for much more exposure to economic disparities, which
varies in form depending on where you live. Second, who people compared themselves to on the
economic ladder was relative to where they themselves stood on the ladder. For example, when
talking about disparities, upper middle class folks pointed to millionaires, while lower working class
folks pointed to middle class white collar professionals.
5.1 New River/Greenbrier Valley, West Virginia
In West Virginia, I traveled through a collection of several counties in the southern region of the
state (see Figure 5.1), mostly in a region known as New River/Greenbrier Valley. Illustrations of the
locations of the main sites I visited can be seen in Figure 5.2.
For a large duration of my time in West Virginia, I traveled throughout Greenbrier County,
renting a room in Lewisburg, a small town with a population of less than 4,000.1 Over a decade
ago, Lewisburg was named by a national media outlet as the “Coolest Small Town in America,” and
residents have held on to such acclaims. The town includes historic bed and breakfasts, a couple of
1All demographic and economic descriptions in this chapter come from the American Community Survey.
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Figure 5.1: West Virginia Map: Counties Under Study
Figure 5.2: New River/ Greenbrier Valley, WV: Towns Visited
high-end restaurants, a handful of quaint shops and one of the world’s only four Carnegie Halls, all
while retaining a small-town feel, making it a standout tourist attraction in the state. And Lewisburg’s
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residents are intent on presenting themselves as distinct from common Appalachian stereotypes. As
one woman who is active in the community, Anna, put it: people need to know that in Lewisburg
we’re not pregnant in the hills.
Lewisburg is one of the most affluent areas of the state. Five and six-bedroom historic homes
are sprinkled around the town, many owned by medical professionals and educators at the local
School of Osteopathic Medicine (or what locals refer to as the “O School”). But even among the
largest and most grandiose homes, asking prices do not even near one million dollars. This town
is also home to the state’s governor, Jim Justice, the richest man (and only billionaire) in the state.
Instead of the governor’s mansion in the state capital, Justice keeps residence in Lewisburg. He is
also the owner of the 11,000-acre Greenbrier luxury resort in White Sulphur Springs, twenty miles
east of Lewisburg. The resort, estimated at 1.5 billion dollars, provides much of the basis for the
local economy in White Sulphur and the surrounding areas. From family gatherings to professional
sports teams to celebrities, the Greenbrier is one of the biggest attractions in the state.
The town of Lewisburg sits on the eastern corner of Greenbrier county. Further to the west lies
other small towns, such as Rupert, Rainelle and Ronceverte. Many West Virginians I met described
these towns as shells of what they used to be. Decades ago, they were bustling economic successes,
inhabited by those working for railroad, lumber or coal mining companies. Today, many of those jobs
have left the area, and what you’ll see is a common picture in rural towns across the country—empty
storefronts and silent streets. Locals mentioned that the new extension of the interstate has made
travel easier. However, many of these sparsely populated areas are separated by hills and valleys,
and commuting involves driving long distances on winding roads. How these communities are laid
out geographically, combined with the fact that large blocks of residents live under the poverty line2
leads to relatively little intra-state movement. The result: small rural communities throughout West
Virginia are often isolated from one another. The geographic isolation of many of the regions of
Appalachia can often facilitate this invisibility of economic differences.
My discussions with locals in West Virginia, who were almost entirely white, revealed a strong
lack of empathy toward other residents. However, race never appeared to be the sole fault line
contributing to this empathy gap. In fact, throughout my time in West Virginia, talk of race and
2In both Rainelle and Rupert, one out of three residents lives in poverty today.
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ethnicity only occasionally came up. Yet some did allude to racial changes they had seen over time.
Deb, a white retired educator and a long time resident in Lewisburg, described the changes she has
seen in the area, particularly in White Sulphur Springs. The Greenbrier Resort has been around
for centuries, seeing both good times and bad. Most importantly, the resort is a vital source of
employment for West Virginians.
Deb: At one time everybody in that town worked at The Greenbrier. Now that’s not the case.
EW: Who is working there?
Deb: Mostly Mexicans. We had an infiltration of Mexicans with the sporting club and the
hotel. Hence we’ve got two Mexican restaurants, which when I was first married, there
was no Mexican restaurant within 50 miles of this place. But they’re cooks, a lot of
them. And then a lot of them are in the grounds crew and the golf course maintenance
crew and all that sort of thing because they’ll still work for minimum wage whereas
people here won’t.
Mike, a local of Canvas in Nicholas County, who is white and in his early 70s, also made a brief
reference to racial others. When discussing economic opportunities he believed to be abundant, he
said: this is why all these Mexicans and people in South America are coming here...I don’t blame
them for wanting to come here. There are opportunities here.
Michelle, a white woman in her 50s living in Rainelle, took on a different tone: All these
immigrants, they need to stay where they are. It’s not our place to take care of all of them. I mean
we’re doing good to take care of ourself. However, these references to immigrants were more directed
at the U.S. broadly than the specific regions in which either Mike or Michelle lived.
Whites in Greenbrier county did not perceive an increase in the already very small African
American population. Deb told me that the biggest black population is in White Sulphur because
they all had the big positions at the Greenbrier back in the day when blacks were your servants and
that’s what kind of brought those families in here to start with. And there were some neighborhoods
in White Sulphur that were pretty affluent, black families. Over in Lewisburg, what used to be the
“black neighborhood,” has declined in size over the generations. In fact, the black population is so
small that Deb was able to list the surnames of all of the black families in the town.
Discussions of race did arise when I interviewed Lisa, a black nursing student in her 20s. We
talked about living in Beckley, the economic challenges the area and the people who live there face,
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race relations, and the ways government has (or has not) helped citizens. At one point I asked about
her opinion on downward redistributive programs.
EW: There’s government programs that can help people from the bottom, or those who have
the least, get by. Things like food stamps, welfare, unemployment. We kind of touched
on this, but who do you see those as benefiting?
Lisa: The drug-addicted, African-Americans because they feel like they have no chance. Yeah.
I mean, pretty much that.
EW: Is there stuff that you like about those programs?
Lisa: I do like that they are at least available. As far as them being as easy as it is to get, I
don’t really agree with [that].
I asked Lisa if she believes its harder to get ahead now than decades past, and she had ambivalent
feelings.
Lisa: Well to an extent. Just because entrepreneurship is a really booming thing right now and
it’s so easy to do. You’ve just got to be willing to take the steps to do it and sacrifice.
And a lot of people here aren’t taught credit. They’re not taught entrepreneurship. How
to have your own. I’ll work for someone else all my life. They don’t really want a sense
of responsibility.
The concept of complacency was a constant theme throughout my discussions in West Virginia.
Lisa also described the factors she believed to be holding back those in the black community.
Lisa: Small businesses, if you’re not a part of their circle, they’re not supporting you. Black-
owned businesses don’t really thrive long. One, due to the lack of support of the
community due to the racism that still is here. And two, a lot of African Americans
here, you would think they would want to see the next one do better and help them get
to where they need to go or even further. But it’s a greed thing so it’s like, ‘I’m going to
get what I need to get and I’m going to move on.’ You know?
Similar to Deb’s description of Lewisburg, Lisa’s description of the black community in the
county was small and insular, where blacks lived primarily in East Beckley. She conveyed that only a
small handful of black people in the area have really been able to climb the economic ladder. This
included her friend Jordan, who owns several businesses in town. In a conversation with Jordan, he
expressed similar frustrations with the roadblocks to economic mobility for blacks in West Virginia.
In these conversations there lies something critical about the context of West Virginia. Because
the black community is small (4% of total population), segregated and lacking in economic and
political capital, blacks do not present as much of a threat in the predominantly white state than in
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other more racially and ethnically diverse areas. The same can be said for Latinos, who comprise a
fraction of the population that blacks do (1.5%).
White West Virginians I interviewed or interacted with rarely, if ever, pointed to a racial other,
and did not express a concern that non-whites were becoming a large share of the population. This is
not to say that racism is not rampant in the state. It certainly is. A couple of folks I talked to made
reference to local Ku Klux Klan chapters. James, a white truck driver in his 20s, told me: I think
West Virginia has more racists than any of the Southern states. On a couple of occasions, I came
across white people making derogatory “jokes,” or using racial stereotypes or imagery.
Maybe I’m mad because people ain’t like me
It was my impression that racial minorities were not the primary driver of a declining sense of
empathy and community identity among white residents in West Virginia. This may not be entirely
surprising, given that the state’s population has hovered around 95% white since the 1960s. Instead,
when asked about a declining sense of identity with those in the state, many pointed to young people,
drug addicts, and those the unemployed—traits that often all intersected. Historically, this type of
language has been racially coded (Hancock, 2004), allowing whites to refer to racial minorities
without having to explicitly. But through all my interactions, it became very clear from those I
interviewed that they were describing whites. Social desirability bias may play some part in this.
Though, as mentioned earlier, many whites I talked to were not apprehensive about saying explicitly
racist things. When it came to discussing those lower on the economic ladder, whites interviewees
were often talking about white people, people they knew or knew of. However, importantly, the poor,
who often by default perceived as beneficiaries of government assistance, were still “othered.”
Consistently, the drug epidemic colored the lens in which West Virginians discussed economic
differences and redistribution. Year after year, West Virginia has topped the charts in opioid-related
deaths per capita in the U.S. A report from the state’s Bureau of Public Health found that in recent
years, white people comprised 94% of all drug overdose fatalities in the state. Moreover, over a
quarter of all fatalities among white men ages 15-34 in West Virginia were due to drug overdoses.
The subject of the opioid epidemic came up when chatting with Curtis and Carrie, a white
married couple in their 50s who are active in their local Baptist church in Oakland. I asked what the
main trade or business was in Oakland. Curtis responded tongue in cheek: Meth, Heroin. When I
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asked if they believe the drug epidemic has contributed to economic changes in the area, the answer
was a resounding yes. Specifically in the case of poverty.
Curtis: I never thought I’d see homeless kids walking down the street in Oak Hill.
EW: You see that personally?
Curtis: Oh yes, if you go out early in the morning, you see it all the time.
The opioid epidemic touched the lives of nearly everyone I came across in West Virginia. In
Beckley county, I met with a white married couple, Wayne and Jackie, who accompanied me to
areas that are commonly referred to as the “hollers”— Appalachia’s variation on the derogatory term
“ghettos” (White, 2007). Wayne is a retired welder and Jackie is still a nurse’s aid. During the time I
visited in May 2019, news was coming out about dozens of physicians in the state being charged
with illegally dispensing opioids. When I asked Wayne and Jackie if they heard this in the news,
Wayne replied: Oh yea. My old doctor was charged with the same thing a couple of years back.
On one occasion Wayne, Jackie and I traveled to a small town, Oceania, up in the hills in
Wyoming county. Oceana has a population of less than 1,500, is 99% white, and 28% of residents live
in poverty. Jackie noted that Oceania is notoriously referred to as “Oxyana,” due to the widespread
use of opiates in the area. We met with Pat, a white Oceanea resident in his 70s who has lived there
his entire adult life. I asked if he felt his community had changed over time.
Pat: Oh of course. And most of them—I say most of them. I don’t know how to say this.
But lots of folks in this county now, and all over the state of West Virginia, they look for
that little pill.
Jackie: Oh, we told her!
Pat: We have over 7,000 kids around foster homes.
Jackie: It’s pitiful.
When I asked West Virginians who they believed benefited from government assistance, the vast
majority referenced drug abusers, or what one Alderson man categorized as “the druggies.” I asked if
the druggies were mainly black, and he responded no. They were the white people he knew and knew
of—neighbors, friends of friends or those he saw around the small town. Importantly, it was not the
case that all of those I interviewed believed every person who used government help was an addict.
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However, they were most likely to accuse drug users as the ones egregiously taking advantage of the
system.
When I asked how people knew others were abusing the system, the response was nearly always
first-hand experiences, seeing it with their own eyes. These people were characterized as greedy
freeloaders, consistent with welfare queen stereotypes which are often implicitly associated with
minorities in inner cities (Hancock, 2004). However, in Appalachia, these stereotypes are strongly
associated with white drug addicts or “hill” people.
Appalachia, particularly in the most rural areas, has historically been seen as a violent space
occupied by primitive people lacking in intelligence (White, 2007). Images of such people, “hillbil-
lies,” are interlaced with notions of drugs and dependency. As Wayne put it: West Virginia is full of
hillbilly heroin. So although poor people who receive government assistance were often perceived by
those I talked to as white, whites still made it a point to differentiate themselves from this group.3
This distinction was made by pointing to disparities in work ethic. Given the self-esteem and dignity
that the claim to hard work offers members of the working class, they distance themselves from
the poor who are considered vagrants (Lamont, 2002). They are classified as lazy, dependent and
selfish. This was particularly the case among many of the older people I talked to, whose perceptions
of employment opportunities, rooted in their own experiences of upward mobility in decades past,
shaped the way they saw those who are unemployed today. They failed to empathize with many
people that used government help, people who they believed were unlike themselves. When reflecting
on why he believes people should not receive handouts from the government, as he never did, Mike
told me: Maybe I’m mad because people ain’t like me.
Ultimately, the sentiment described in earlier chapters I found to be present in West Virginia:
those people aren’t like us. This perception has risen over time in part due to an opioid epidemic
that has directly affected large sects of the state population. Whether through drug addiction or
complacency, many of the people I talked to believed people’s poor economic circumstances in West
3Because intersectionality identifies boundary markers that make visible the politics of exclusion, White
(2007) uses an intersectional lens to examine how white people within Appalachia are differentiated. She
describes: “Because we live in a time when there are no deserving poor, particularly post-welfare reform,
and because the undeserving poor have been positioned as racialized “others,” there are, ipso facto, no white
poor. Appalachian poverty is virtually invisible. Its invisibility is facilitated by racist assumptions about
deservingness that can only be explained by looking at the intersections between race and class.”
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Virginia as deserved. The distinctions between who are and aren’t “people like me,” was important
in shaping how people felt about existing disparities.
The East Gets Everything
When asking people to describe the economic differences seen in their own lives, one common
narrative I came across while traveling through Greenbrier Valley is “the East gets everything.” This
is mainly a reference to Lewisburg drawing in more money, jobs, and public funding than smaller
communities to the west, such as Rainelle, a half-hour drive from Lewisburg. The regional economic
differences are tangible when one drives through east and west Greenbrier county. Towns like
Rainelle and Rupert have fewer, if any, grocery stores or gas stations, and residents are much more
likely to live in low-income housing or mobile homes. One can really understand the difference when
comparing the county’s only two high schools. Greenbrier East High is ranked among the top twenty
percent of public schools in West Virginia, whereas the much smaller Greenbrier West remains in
the bottom 50 percent. When talking to those who lived in the western end of the county, there is a
tangible bitterness toward the east, whose residents were often characterized as elitist. According to
one woman I met at a pub outside of White Sulphur: Lewisburg thinks they’re a little Manhattan.
On one occasion I interviewed a white woman in her 30s, Amy, who is an accountant for a
non-profit and grew up about 50 miles outside of Greenbrier county. She described the divide she
encountered when moving to the area.
Amy: I didn’t realize there was a divide when I came here because I’m not from here. My
husband didn’t realize it. We had no idea. Eastern Greenbrier, even the high school
students– because I deal with children that age and they’re not all from Greenbrier
County, but even with people I work with that went to Eastern Greenbrier literally think
that Western Greenbrier is nothing but trash, drug addict, poor. That’s how they look
at them. And people from here look at people over there as snotty, rich, stuck up. It’s
just insane. It’s insane. And they get more. Their school systems get more, and they’re
better, which is crazy because it’s the same county, but I’ve seen it myself.
What is interesting about the relationship between Greenbrier east and west is how reflective it
is of rural and urban divides throughout the country. Cramer (2016) argues that among rural whites,
economic concerns do matter, but it’s the relative resources that matter, and often by symbolically
signaling social esteem. But while Cramer documents the resentment among rural Midwesterners
toward huge urban cities such as Madison or Milwaukee, the case of Greenbrier county suggests
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this dynamic can happen anywhere. Keep in mind Lewisburg is a town of only 4,000 people, with
an average income of under $39,000 (the median income in the U.S. nationally is $60,000) and it
certainly could not be categorized as urban. It is a far cry from Manhattan. But when West Greenbrier
folk think about those who they are economically different from, they use Lewisburg as a reference
point. Though it is important to note Jim Justice is in the top .1% and resides in Lewisburg. But
a lot of the area’s wealth lies in the Greenbrier resort and the million-dollar homes surrounding
it. However, of all those I talked to, when talking about economic disparities in the region, not
one person ever voluntarily brought up Justice, or the Greenbrier resort, without me asking. When
thinking about those who have more than their fair share, West Greenbrier residents were more
likely to target those who work behind a desk or hippie retirees in Lewisburg than those on Forbes’
billionaires list. People look up, but not always all the way up.
They’re What We Call Upper-Class Poor
Similar to recent work on political attitudes in rural areas in the U.S. (Cramer, 2016; Hochschild,
2018), I found that several of those I talked to expressed a strong mistrust of government as well as
resentment toward government employees. What was surprising is this bitterness was even directed
at public school teachers, typically a group that many Americans have a strong affinity toward.
With a median salary of $45,700, teacher pay in West Virginia is among the lowest in the nation,
and the state has had a hard time recruiting and retaining faculty. In 2018, the teacher’s union
(including 20,000 teachers in all 55 counties), went on a 9-day strike, calling for a pay raise. The
strike was successful to some degree (teachers ended up receiving a fraction of the pay increase
they initially demanded). They then went on strike again in 2019, this time protesting a Republican-
sponsored bill that would raise funds for charter schools and education savings accounts, which
would allow taxpayer dollars to pay for private school tuition. Similar strikes popped up around
the nation calling to block government efforts toward privatizing education. Though the strike was
successful, it left many West Virginians frustrated. Anger toward the teacher strike came from parents
who had to suddenly find childcare or had to miss work because of the strike. But it also arose from
those who were not directly affected. This was the case for Will and Ronnie, a married couple in
their 50s living in an unincorporated poor community that sits on the Kanawha River.
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Ronnie: The first time they [went on strike] last year, there was a lot of sympathy initially because
they had been promised by the governor that they would be getting pay increases, and
it wasn’t coming up on the legislative agenda. They did it again this year and it really
had a more sour taste to it this time. There wasn’t a whole lot you could do. A lot of
people saw it as—a lot of non-educators saw it as just a temper tantrum. The first one
was understood and everything. But then this one was seen more as a temper tantrum. I
mean, we know educators who just were livid, and I had to not have conversations with
them about it because I just disagreed.
EW: So just for this most recent time you saw it as a temper tantrum?
Ronnie: This time, yes. Well, and I didn’t really– I’m not really much on public employees
striking. I had worked for the state for a long time, and public employees are a different
breed because it’s tax money. It’s not an infinite business that’s trying to negotiate a
contract. It’s people who are employed with tax dollars holding the taxpayer hostage.
So I’m not a big fan of it.
This topic also came up with Andy, a former teacher in her 50s living in White Sulphur Spring.
Andy described how the teacher strike illuminated class conflict, telling me that teachers are what we
call ‘upper-class poor.’
Andy: Give you increased sick leave, give you more medical benefits or what—it never seems
to be enough. We’ve still got to always be the downtrodden victim. And they’ve kind of
come into an impasse there. Now, the teachers in West Virginia– it’s been interesting
being the lowest-paid salaries in the country. Where you’re still the upper-middle-class
if you’re a teacher. And compared to those around you, you live in the nicer houses and
drive the nicer cars because you’re teachers. So it makes it very hard for a lot of people
to listen to teachers when they’re already that well off.
EW: I see what you’re saying.
Andy: So when the bulk of your population thinks that teachers have it made good, they’re not
going to be as supportive to the legislators for big raises for the teachers when they’re
going hungry and not getting their electric bill paid.
This tension within the lower and middle class is important. Instead of resentment toward the
top 1% or large conglomerates, I witnessed people’s resentment target those much closer to their
own economic standing, specifically at other residents within the state. In comparison to Cramer’s
findings, this shows residents don’t have to necessarily reach the socioeconomic status of tenured
professors in large cities for them to be resented. These discussions signaled that many of those
lower end of the economic ladder feel they are a part of a zero-sum game within the bottom 90% or
99%, where more for them means less for us.
An Old Country Guy Just Like Us
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While I found numerous incidents of conflict within lower and middle income groups, there was
a surprising affinity for the rich. This was the case for low and middle-income people in particular.
Some of those I talked to would list the good deeds of the wealthy, or suggest that along some lines
the rich were “just like us.”
Jim Justice in particular brought out a lot of opinions. Justice is controversial. Despite being a
registered Republican, Justice ran for governor as a conservative Democrat and won. Months after
taking office in 2017, he declared his support for Donald Trump and returned to the Republican Party.
Like Trump, Justice has made his name heading a business empire. This includes a huge stake in the
coal mining industry, a coal mining business he inherited from his father. Also like Trump, Justice
has a strong reputation for not paying his bills. This was known among every person in the state I
talked to, whether they defended him or not. Deb, the retired public school educator in Lewisburg,
had a particular soft spot for Justice.
Deb: Jim Justice is a self-made billionaire. He’s on the Forbes list of billionaires in the United
States. He bought the Greenbrier when it was in bankruptcy [and] so he got it for a great
bargain. And he’s put a lot of money into it but he’s made a lot of money from it. He
owns coal mines. He owns agriculture. They say that there’s no other person, single
human, that owns more land on the east coast of the United States than Jim Justice. And
when he decided to run for governor they thought, “How in the world?” But he’s a man
that thinks he can do everything or finds the right person to do it and then he oversees.
EW: Hmm. So kind of like Trump?
Deb: Very similar. There’s a lot of similarities. And a lot of people like to put him down and
make out that he’s somebody crooked. Jim Justice is not a crooked man. He is highly
misunderstood and misinterpreted because he is a businessman. And the average person
doesn’t think that way a businessman thinks. Jim Justice, he gets a lot of bad press
about not paying his bills, but he does. Number one, he never pays a bill till the job’s
done and he’s satisfied.
He has coached the girl’s basketball team at our local high school, I don’t know, 18
years now? And he’s taken them to the State Championship three times. He loves to
coach, he loves the girls. He is wonderfully generous to them.
In these excerpts, Deb defends Justice by describing him as self-made, ambitious and principled.
But she also makes a point to describe his generosity and relationship with the community, the
“average folk.” Others I talked with had similar praise. In a conversation with Jack, a 23-year old
garage worker earning $11 an hour, I asked about his perception of those at the top.
EW: I know you can’t think of all rich people as the same but generally, how do you think




Jack: I mean they’re either just talented at what they do or smart enough to get to where they
are by working or just smart enough to get it out of other people.
EW: Do you think they deserve to be that rich?
Jack: If they work hard enough, like I said.
When describing those at the top of the economic ladder, Jack points to their work ethic and
intelligence. I then asked for his thoughts on Justice. Like Deb, Jack makes a point to highlight the
governor’s positive qualities.
Jack: I know people that know him personally and they talk good about him. And he’s just an
old country guy just like the rest of us.
This perception of those at the top as people “just like us” was also expressed by Mike and
Susan, a white retired couple living in Canvas. They are in their 70s and have lived in their rural
home since their children, now in their 40s, were born. Mike was a blue collar-worker and Susan
was a homemaker and worked odd jobs in retail. When I asked about those at the top, Mike listed
several men he believed to be millionaires that he knew around Nicholas county, adding the good
works they did in their community.
Mike: See those millionaires are helping their towns, and they should, but I don’t think there
has to be a law that you have to do it .
Susan: And you talk to these people and you would never know that they were millionaires!
Mike got heated during many of our discussions, and during this one in particular. When I asked
how he believed the rich get to where they are, he became increasingly frustrated and defensive. Even
without me bringing up politics or policy, Mike perceived these questions as heavily politicized.
Mike: Well it’s like the government saying “You’re a success. You’re great. Now we’re gonna
penalize you because you worked your asses off.”
EW: Do you think all millionaire are successes that worked their asses off?
Mike: No.
EW: But do you think most of them worked their asses off?
Mike: The ones I know did! The ones I know in this town. Forty years ago they were just like
me. They’re still like me! Personally, you can talk to them and you would never know.
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These conversations collectively illustrated a tendency from interviewees to judge the rich as
not only deserving but as charitable members of the community whom interviewees could identify
with. This way of thinking is consistent with other qualitative work documenting how Americans
lower on the economic ladder narrow the perceived distance between themselves and the very rich
(Lamont, 2002; Condon and Wichowsky, 2020). But why? System justification theory (SJT) offers
one explanation. Exposure to inequality increases anxiety. SJT suggests people have an innate
motivation to reduce this anxiety and feel a sense of control. This is accomplished by believing the
world as just and fair, and in turn deeming disparities as legitimate and approving of the status quo.
For members of low-status groups, who can feel inferior to those with higher status, this can lead to
the expression of positive affect toward members of higher-status groups (Jost et al., 2004; Condon
and Wichowsky, 2020).
Overall, these initial analyses give us more nuanced insight into how people perceived economic
disparities— who are the haves and have-nots? Do people see these groups as people like themselves?
Are their economic statuses deserved? The answers to these questions were varied, but appeared
to be shaped by people’s own economic status as well as the community in which they lived. For
many whites I talked to about economic inequality, race was not very salient. But just as rising
diversity has increased the potential for empathy gaps in other corners of the nation, other types of
population changes within West Virginia may have as well. Over the past few decades, the state has
experienced declines in some of its bedrock industries, such as coal or other natural resource based
industries. As these industries (and jobs) left many areas of the state, reliance on opiates increased
(Kobak, 2012; Moody et al., 2017), which has had its own devastating effects on economies.4 West
Virginia is perhaps unique in this regard in that it has the highest opioid overdose death rate in the
country. Overall, the crisis has had disparate impacts on those who live there, creating further internal
divisions within the population.
West Virginians’ perception of the “haves” was also a bit surprising. Those who were relatively
economically disadvantaged pointed fingers at people like those in Lewisburg who they perceived to
be as competitors for resources (e.g., industry, schools, state funds). Both people in Lewisburg and




culture or ideology. For example recall that a woman outside of Lewisburg resentfully described the
town as “little Manhattan” while a Lewisburg resident distinguished residents as “not pregnant in
the hills.” However, those I talked to were much less likely to point fingers at the very rich, which
in the context of Greenbrier Valley is Jim Justice or the luxury Greenbrier resort. Initially, I found
this pattern a bit perplexing. But the wealth and privilege that are concentrated within the gates of
Greenbrier resort is hidden away from many locals. Thus, one important factor shaping perceptions
of disparities here may be the visibility of the rich, who in many places are residentially segregated
from people of other classes (Condon and Wichowsky, 2020). Residents may also be reluctant to
challenge or criticize the few “haves” who hold substantial leverage over the labor market, such
as Justice, who has his hands in all types of industries within the state. This pattern is consistent
with John Gaventa’s own ethnographic study of Clear Forks, West Virginia several decades ago.
An eerie parallel to current conditions, Gaventa (1982) argues that the quiescence that occurs in
situations of glaring inequality can be a consequence of the dependence that people have on their
own (exploitative) employers, such as big coal.
5.2 The Lowcountry, South Carolina
I now turn to the southern coastal region of South Carolina, often referred to as “the Lowcountry.”
During fieldwork I primarily focused on Charleston county, where I am originally from. An
illustration of this region and surrounding counties, including Berkeley, Dorchester and Colleton
County, is shown in Figure 5.3. A more detailed illustration of Charleston is shown in Figure
5.4. Charleston has a population under half a million people, which include residents on the main
peninsula and on the neighboring areas across the water (e.g, James Island).
Of the four counties, Charleston is the most economically viable. Modern wealth in this area
has many of its roots in the slave trade and economy that was established in the 16th century.
Even after slavery was formally abolished, the systemic economic oppression of blacks in the area
continued— while changing in form—and continues today. This region has an abundance of former
slave plantations, historic forts and military bases, and other historic sites that bring in tourists from
all over the world. While the area has several sizable colleges and industries, the economic bedrock
of Charleston is tourism, with an estimated 7 million visitors each year. A part of the allure of
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Figure 5.3: Map of the South Carolina Lowcountry: Counties Under Study
Figure 5.4: Map of Charleston County, South Carolina
Charleston is its “old money” glamour. The county is flooded with hundreds of multi-million dollar
homes and lavish dining and shopping options.
Charleston ranks as the 121st most unequal county in the U.S., where the top 10% of earners
receive nearly half of all total income earned. Similar to the rest of the South, race and class
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are heavily intertwined in Charleston. Poverty and unemployment disproportionately affect black
residents compared to white residents, where on average blacks’ median income is half of that of
whites and the black unemployment rate is triple that of whites. The county is also highly racially
and economically segregated. Much of the area’s affluence is concentrated in the areas near the
downtown peninsula and closer to the water. In contrast, areas more inland experience substantially
greater poverty rates. For example, about 1 in 4 of those in North Charleston live in poverty, where
48% of residents are white and 46% are black. The poverty rate on Sullivan’s Island, where 97% of
residents are white, is about 6%.
In this section, I document the themes I observed concerning inequality and redistribution from
talking to folks in the Charleston area. Most of these insights come from two focus groups I facilitated
in downtown Charleston. Individual characteristics of the participants in each focus group are shown
in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. On average, participants in the first focus group were more racially/ethnically
diverse and had lower incomes than those in the second group, who were all white and for the most
part economically well off. Throughout this section I will refer to these focus groups as group 1 and
group 2.
Table 5.1: Focus Group 1 Participant Characteristics
Name Age Race/Ethnicity Party ID Income
James 55 Black No preference $40,000 to $49,999
Sam 41 White Democrat $10,000 to $19,999
Martin 21 Latino No preference $30,000 to $39,999
John 23 Asian/Pacific Islander Independent $70,000 to $79,999
Table 5.2: Focus Group 2 Participant Characteristics
Name Age Race/Ethnicity Party ID Income
Danielle 57 White Republican $100,000 to $149,999
Elizabeth 56 White Republican $40,000 to $49,999
Sarah 53 White Independent $150,000 to $200,000
Abby 75 White Democrat $150,000 to $200,000
Paul 68 White Independent $150,000 to $200,000
Tiffany 62 White Republican $100,000 to $149,999
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Focus groups began with an initial discussion of what inequality is. At one point during focus
group 2, Paul, a white self-identified Independent bringing in over $150k income a year, remarked
on my use of the term.
Paul: Yeah, if I could just say, I find the term inequality to be pejorative versus different. I
mean, there are economic differences, but I’m interested in defining terms. It has a
pejorative term to it ... you’re saying there is something wrong that’s occurred here as a
result, which is obviously the problem that your research is trying to solve.
EW: Okay, so you’re saying that the word ‘inequality’, something’s wrong.
Paul: Yeah, you make it seem right now – well, that the guy that has the house by the water,
you know, that son of a gun!
EW: Well, you could say they’re unequal, but you could also say they’re different.
Paul: Yeah, but terms mean something, and I just offer that that’s almost going in towards a
conclusion when you use a term like that.
EW: Some people might not see the term inequality as pejorative, so–
Paul: I don’t! – of course, they’d be wrong. [laughs]
In this exchange, Paul suggests that the term inequality was loaded, and that by my use of the
word, I was suggesting that there was something inherently unethical or wrong that should be made
right. But he makes sure to point out that he does believe inequality is a bad thing. Paul’s critique of
my facilitation of the group is important because it again demonstrates how uncomfortable people
can be when talking about inequality. People don’t particularly enjoy talking about how they are
personally better or worse off than somebody else.
Notably, the second focus group was on average much more educated than the first. However,
one similarity across members of both focus groups was they had not always lived in Charleston.
This was a stark contrast to those in West Virginia. Some had grown up in South Carolina, went
elsewhere for a few years, and returned. Others moved to the state as newcomers. However, all
participants had been living in Charleston for at very least the past few years. I asked people what
changes they have seen in the area over the years, and several people brought up the increasing
population size and the types of people moving to the region. In group 2, which included all white
subjects, sometimes the responses were implicitly linked to race and ethnicity.
Danielle: You wanna really do a study? Lay out a country club pool, about 3 different times on a
Saturday or Sunday afternoon. How many different languages are you gonna hear from
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the parents and the children? I have noticed a vast difference in the last 5 to 8 years,
’cause we lived in two sets of different neighborhoods in that time frame.
Paul: Or where I left in Newport!
Danielle: When you talk about this state, there is definitely a lot of people that have influxed in
here from a lot of diverse backgrounds.
But there also was a lot of discussion centering around those who emigrated from other states
within the U.S. or other countries that were affluent and not necessarily coming from a minority group.
Specifically, they identified extreme forms of gentrification, where the rich are getting one-upped by
the richer.
Paul: I think, as a recent arrival, I think I am indicative of what’s happened to Charleston.
You have so many that have come from other locations, I mean, people are buying
homes with cash. Well, that was not Charleston 30 years ago, whatever the case may
be, and that, in itself, is creating a greater divide between the haves and have-nots just
because the amount of wealth that is coming here from out of the area. How many of
those homes south of Broad now are owned by outsiders, not by Charlestonians? A
Charlestonian native probably can’t afford that unless they’re a high roller.
Abby: Well, and I heard something from a Mount Pleasant town council person that was
saying that, in Mount Pleasant, there are a lot of people that come from California and
Connecticut, where the prices are very high, and they actually still keep their jobs there,
kind of commute during the week, but their families are all set up in a huge, giant houses
with the incomes from Connecticut and California.
Tiffany: Which has inflated the housing industry, whereas locals, it makes it harder and harder to
be able to afford even a 2,500 square foot home.
Paul: And that’s why you drive south of Broad at night time, and you see how many lights are
out because they’re not here from California, and those are second homes.
This recognition of the shifting makeup of the area was also present when I spoke with Lydia, a
white woman in her late 40s who has lived in Colleton county her entire life, in an in-depth interview.
Lydia: Well, I said I’m from the country, but I still lived there in Walterboro, well, 8 miles
down the other side of Walterboro. I mean, there’s literally no one around what use to
be my grandmother’s house. People from Wales own it, so there’s a lot – you would not
even think about that. We’re talking about all this, but there are a lot of foreigners that
are moving to Walterboro and Ruffin and Lodge because it’s nothing.
These conversations do not necessarily point to a racial other, but to an economic other— eco-
nomically advantaged others. This discussion of the influx of those at the top was common throughout
the entire discussion with group 2, who when considering economic changes and challenges facing
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the region, looked up. Those in group 1 expressed overall less concern surrounding who the residents
in the area are. This may be related to the fact that in addition to the group being mostly non-white
and younger, group 1 participants were bringing in incomes that were substantially lower than the
incomes of those in group 2.
I don’t have a yacht, although we do have a number of boats
When discussing economic disparities and challenges in the area, those who I talked to in
Charleston conferred much more about those at the top than those in West Virginia. This included
discussions of materialism, inter-generational wealth, and changes in the housing market. On several
occasions, participants identified how wealth and privilege were concentrated among a small number
of people and passed down over generations. Danielle noted: There’s a term; it’s called economic
outpatient— children who just sort of be off the parent—I think there’s a lot of that here because
there’s a lot of wealth here. In group 1, Sam, who is white, discussed how gentrification has affected
the cost of living.
Sam: I can just go off an observation of growing up here. And, like, I think my mom bought
our house in Mount—the first house we had in Mount Pleasant for, like, $40,000. Like,
you can’t even fathom paying now. That’s not even, like—that’s just hard to believe.
That was, like, in the late ’70s, early ’80s. And, yeah. I mean, like, a house that
she—like, the second house, the house that I grew up in, they bought for, like, 180,000.
It’s now worth over half a million. It’s the same house. The same place.
At one point our my conversation I asked participants to write down the answer to the following
question: on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 = most economically disadvantaged and 10 = most
economically advantaged, what number would you give yourself? Subjects were then asked why
they gave themselves that number. Interestingly, those in group 2 (the more economically advantaged
group) consistently focused on the have’s as opposed to the have-not’s. This is likely related to the
fact that economic disparities are highly visible in the area.
Andy: I put a 7. Lots of people have a lot more money than I do. Not lots–a number of people
have a lot more money than I do, but I feel like I’m very comfortable. We’re— my
husband and I are both retired. We have stocks, our house is paid for, our cars are paid
for. I don’t want for anything. I feel like I’m pretty comfortable, quite honestly, but I do
know there’s a number of people. I see the yachts. I don’t have a yacht, although we do
have a number of boats.
Paul: The key is to know somebody that has one.
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Beyond Borders
The biggest standout difference I found when talking to people in Charleston versus Greenbrier
Valley was the role of geographic mobility. Most West Virginians grew up and lived in the same town,
or at least in Appalachia, their entire lives. In contrast, those I talked to in Charleston, particularly
those with higher incomes, not only have lived in different places but have also traveled and been
exposed to a wider variety of places.
EW: When you think about economic inequality in the United States, do you think about it in
terms of people within the US? Do you think about it as within the South, within South
Carolina, or within your own neighborhood? Anyone’s welcome to start.
Abby: I think of it across the country.
Paul: I’d agree. I think that’s national. It’s global.
EW: So, is there any reason why your mind goes to the nation?
Paul: Because I’ve seen it in every place I’ve ever lived.
Abby: And I’ve seen a difference.
Danielle: I have too.
Sarah: The nation. I travel internationally for work, so I also think of it internationally, but I do
think about it nationally.
Abby: I think I compare myself to people within the region because I’m more familiar with
this.
Tiffany: The region, also, for me.
Elizabeth: I would say through the country because I think this region is high-intensity upper class.
I mean, not upper class, but higher in general, maybe... they seem to be. It just seems to
be a lot wealthier overall.
EW: So, maybe not reflective of the whole nation?
Elizabeth: Yeah, I don’t think it’s accurately reflective of the whole nation.
Danielle: I see it from the whole country, however I see it regionally, and I see it from background
obviously having moved around to different places. Information technology changed
everything completely, so I think it’s a big factor.
When thinking about the broad concept of economic differences, most people in group 2 did
not necessarily point to those within the region. Their experiences, whether this was related to
work, family or peer ties, indicated a broader awareness of inequality beyond South Carolina. In
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contrast, Elizabeth, who by far is the lowest on the socioeconomic scale in the group, suggests being
in Charleston, with income concentrated into a select few, is a slanted picture compared to elsewhere.
I then asked the group to think of who they compare themselves to economically. A common theme
was peer groups. But again, this didn’t necessarily mean neighborhood peers.
Tiffany: I work a lot online, and I do have a major peer group across everywhere, so I hear it and
feel it and just crossing stories and exchanging of information with other workers.
Abby: Not originally being from here, I still have family and friends that are sort of all over.
We have grown-up children that are sort of all over, and so I feel like I see what’s around,
and I see how they’re doing. People I’m close to that are out and about, so that’s why I
would say country.
Sarah: I’m sure there’s always been people who, I mean... the human animal..is competitive.
As soon as we had houses and we weren’t foraging, I’m pretty sure people found a new
way to compete, but I do think it’s more, and I think one of the things that’s interesting
to me is, usually, people compete against what they perceive to be their peer group, and
one thing that I’ve found interesting is that I no longer have a local peer group. My
peers, the people I hang with, I’m online with them. They’re around the world.
Danielle: I concur with that.
Susan: They’re in Nashville at home, and now they’ve moved elsewhere. Everyone’s moving;
no one stays in one place, and so, to me, that’s been an interesting distinction.
Those in group 1 also pointed to disparities beyond county and state borders, but in different ways.
Martin immigrated with his family to South Carolina from Venezuela and John’s parents immigrated
from the Philippines. This background shaped the way they thought of economic differences.
Martin: I would say, I haven’t traveled much in the United States, but you know, the distribution
amongst people, like I see on King Street on, like, just one regular walk from one side
of King Street to the other, there’s not many homeless. You know, the distribution
between them and average, mediocre annual income people to be maybe—like, 2% of
all Kings Street would be, like, homeless people, which I feel like would be—if that
was a representation of the United States, that’d be incredibly good, right, for only, like,
2% of it to be homeless people. I’m from Venezuela where stuff is much worse.
EW: I see.
Martin: My country is doing horrible right now. Yeah. I mean, it doesn’t matter how much
money you have, you’re going to be poor. So compare Venezuela to the United States,
it’s, like, astronomical, you know?
When I asked group 1 to select a number on the economic ladder, John picked an 8. John has the
highest income in the group. But at the same time he earns half the income of Abby in group 2, who
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said she thinks of economic differences more regionally and gave herself a 7. I asked him to explain
why he chose the number he did.
John: I put an eight originally. I was thinking about, like, more of an in-country perspective.
But then I started to think more about the trip I took to the Philippines to see my family
over the summer. And when I was there, I was thinking about—so I brought my cello
with me, and my cello is worth $40,000, which some people can make that in a year
here, but in the Philippines, I did the math, if you combined the average income of 25
Filipinos, and you added it all together, it’s still not enough to pay for my cello.
The statements from Martin and John draw attention to a phenomena that American inequality
scholars have yet to fully address. As we become an increasingly globalized society, how might
exposure and awareness to poverty (or wealth) both within and outside of the U.S. shape individual
attitudes about one’s own status?
Collectively, my research in South Carolina revealed a couple of things. First, somewhat similar
to what we saw in West Virginia, I found that upper middle class people perceived the “haves” as those
just above themselves on the economic ladder in their own environments. These discussions had a
“keeping up with the Joneses” quality to them. There was little reflection on how they personally felt
about their own economically advantaged status, and more of a focus on the infiltration of millionaire
retirees from out west or the northeast who have been contributing to exponential real estate prices.
Though not exactly the same, this pattern struck a similar tune to West Virginians’ concerns about
the sharing of economic resources and opportunities with those unlike themselves. This observation
also suggests another important distinction between West Virginia and South Carolina. Unlike West
Virginia, South Carolina has experienced huge hikes in in-migration from other states. In contrast,
West Virginia is struggling to keep people from leaving the state. Even by only talking to a couple of
dozen people, this difference was overtly palpable. Nearly all those I interviewed in West Virginia
had lived in the same small town their whole life. South Carolinian interviewees, on the other hand,
had experienced much more geographic mobility in their lifetimes.
5.3 Discussion
In this chapter, I have presented several patterns and insights I observed from talking to every day
people from different backgrounds and contexts. While these stories cannot be identified as strictly
indicative or representative of the larger populations, they give us a small look into how people
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think. Importantly, many of the trends I observed are consistent with some of the findings presented
by Condon and Wichowsky (2020) and Cramer (2016) in their own qualitative study of economic
inequality. This suggests that insights from my work in the field should have farther reach than the
specific contexts from which they came.
Though qualitative research is typically not equipped for theory testing, it is extremely helpful for
theory building. For example, future research might examine the ways in which personal geographic
mobility or lived experiences have shaped how people think of issues related to inequality. Moving
forward with this research, I plan to develop more fully formed theories with the qualitative data I
have already collected. This project may also require more data collection. The data I have for each
of the two locations is admittedly unbalanced in that interviewees in South Carolina were through
focus groups as opposed to the one-on-one interviews in West Virginia. I found quickly when in
West Virginia that getting participants together for focus groups in a private place was difficult. As
mentioned earlier, the towns I visited were very small and often far away from each other. There
were also few good options in terms of locations for focus groups. Given current circumstances
(COVID-19), any future data collection could involve virtual interviews and focus groups, which
have become increasingly popular (Kahle, 2007).
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION
Over the past decade, scholars of American politics have become increasingly more cognizant
of the ways in which growing economic disparities play a role in political outcomes, as well as
how our politics, in turn, shape disparities (Gilens, 2012; Kelly, 2009, 2020). In this manuscript
I focus on public opinion, one of the most critical intermediaries in this cyclical relationship. To
better understand the broader phenomenon that continues to perplex us — why, in the face of rising
inequality, is there not greater public demand for more redistribution?— I point to the role of empathy.
Rising inequality promotes comparisons with economic others, inducing economic anxiety (Condon
and Wichowsky, 2020). In such states, we are motivated to empathize with those like ourselves,
and consequently, want to help those like ourselves. However, we do not have the same response
for those unlike ourselves, who we may in fact be less likely to help. In this research I argue that
race is a lens in which we see (or don’t see) others as people like ourselves. While the role of racial
and ethnic groups in redistributive politics is a rich topic of discussion among comparative politics
scholars, it has been given less attention in scholarship on income inequality in the U.S. Yet race is
one of the most salient group divisions in the country, and has always been entangled with economic
inequality. Overall, examining how race shapes public opinion is necessary if we are to understand
the American public’s response to inequality.
Through a series of analyses of survey data at both the individual and aggregate level, this
dissertation examines the ways in which race and racial empathy shape attitudes in the context
of rising inequality. By leveraging key variation in the American states over time, Chapter 2
demonstrates that the mass public’s response to rising inequality is conditional on racial diversity.
When states are more diverse, there is a weaker perception that the citizenry is composed of “people
like us,” and in turn citizens on average are less willing to support equalizing policies in response to
inequality. However, when states are less racially diverse, the public is more likely to see themselves
as part of the people of their state. This greater level of empathy allows for greater support of
government intervention to help others. This chapter helps us better understand the trends seen in
mass preferences over time, not only for policy areas that have been explicitly racialized by the media
or politicians (e.g., welfare), but for equality-reducing policies more broadly.
Chapter 3 explores more deeply the individual psychological processes that shape our response
to inequality— empathy. This chapter builds on earlier studies which demonstrate experimentally
that anxiety decreases outgroup empathy (Arceneaux, 2017). I examine if this pattern of behavior
holds up in the real world, where there are direct political implications. I use the economic crisis
spurred by COVID-19, which has had devastating effects on millions of people’s personal financial
situations, to leverage variation in economic anxiety. I find that whites who are most economically
vulnerable (e.g., lower income and in poor employment situations) are less likely to have concern for
racial outgroups. These findings contribute to a growing literature exploring the puzzling lack of
support that low-income citizens, particularly whites, have for greater government (Cramer, 2016;
Hochschild, 2018). Moving forward with this manuscript, I plan to more fully develop the connection
between actual inequality, economic anxiety and empathy.
While the analyses in Chapters 2 and 3 suggest that the puzzle we see is public opinion is driven
by whites, this may not be the whole story. In Chapter 2, I find suggestive evidence that larger shares
of blacks in state populations lead other racial and ethnic minorities to feel less a part of the people in
their state. This is consistent with other work suggesting that racial minorities—not just whites—can
be inclined to see other racial groups, other people who are not like them, in a negative light (Kim,
2000; McClain et al., 2006; Gay, 2006; Wilkinson, 2015). Aside from whites, blacks have also
become increasingly opposed to government redistribution (Ashok et al., 2015; Tate, 2010). However,
public opinion scholars studying the intersection of race and redistribution have almost exclusively
focused on white attitudes.1 Future scholarship would benefit from more deeply exploring the unique
factors that shape redistributive preferences among members of various racial and ethnic groups.
Finally, the last two chapters of this manuscript take on a slightly different note. Instead of
providing another empirical study that tests my theory, I took the road less traveled and talked to
people, allowing them to tell me what is and is not relevant to their own political attitudes. I use
qualitative data collected from interviews conducted while “on the ground.” My fieldwork research
allows me to illustrate the ways in which average people from different backgrounds and contexts
1See Harris-Lacewell (2003) for further elaboration on this point.
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discuss issues related to economic inequality. In the field, I found that who “us” and “them” are not
only shaped who people believed were more deserving of help, but fundamentally shaped the ways
in which they saw economic disparities. I also find that who is “us” or “them” can be defined by race,
but it also can be defined by class, ideology or geography— which importantly, can all intersect with
race.
As is often the case when working with qualitative data— nothing is ever clean cut. People are
messy. There is no secret formula or model that can predict every person’s opinion on each subject
matter. Moving forward, I would like to expand on the initial qualitative analyses with the inclusion
of more data I have already collected, which can fill much more than one or two chapters. Given that
my inferences are limited by the types of people I talk to, in the future I would also like to conduct
more interviews and focus groups with people from different economic and racial backgrounds.
These extended analyses will help me create more fully developed theories from the data. This would
include a greater discussion of how people see inequality and how this contributes to their attitudes
towards policy routes to address it.
The story I have described in this dissertation is rather simple. Rising economic inequality
leads to comparison with others and anxiety, and in such conditions, we have been evolutionarily
wired to help those in our group and refuse help to those in other groups. We prioritize people like
ourselves at the expense of the larger population. But, importantly, here I mostly demonstrate how
this pattern is borne out among white Americans. While I find support for my expectations using
several forms of data, which corroborates other research on white attitudes, I do not expect that
an empathy deficit is preordained. In the past few years, scholars have in fact identified a growing
sympathy among whites for the injustices experienced by racial minorities (Chudy, 2020; Chudy
et al., 2019). In June 2020, widespread protests against police brutality and anti-black racism erupted
across the country. From Los Angeles to Detroit to even Huntington, West Virginia, hundreds of
thousands of people, including a substantial number of whites, came out to demand change from
our institutions and the systemic racism they uphold. This sort of uprising is unprecedented. Whites
in mass are beginning to acknowledge racism in its many forms. This even includes recognizing
the ways in which they personally have, figuratively, kept their foot on the necks of people of color.
These revelations and discussions are occurring among whites despite the fact that we are in the midst
of a global economic crisis. Though I find that economic distress leads economically vulnerable
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whites to feel less empathic concern for racial others, this does not necessarily contradict the fact
we see a large-scale shift in whites’ baseline empathy for racial minorities. I have argued that race
provides a critical force in shaping the divide between us and them. While this undoubtedly remains
true, our conception of “people like us”, as well as who deserves help, can evolve. Indeed, one
of the most formidable changes we have seen in the past several weeks is a heightened awareness
of the experiences of others. More and more white people are finally beginning to ask what it is
like to be in the shoes of someone else, someone non-white. For example, public documentations
of violence against black people, such as the video of the Minnesota police officer who murdered
George Floyd by kneeling on his neck, have ignited unfounded levels of empathy among whites.
Consequently, there has been more serious discussions and support of policies, such as reparations or
radical reforms of the criminal justice system, that can have significant long term positive impacts on
economic and racial disparities.
The events of the past several weeks do not controvert the story told here. If anything, they only




A.1 Chapter 2 Appendix
A.1.1 Summary Statistics
Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics (1969-2014)
Variable Min Max Median Mean SD
Racial Diversity 0.01 0.52 0.21 0.23 0.13
Top 1 Income Share 1.09 23.37 4.94 5.53 3.15
Economic Public Liberalism -3.60 2.72 -0.18 -0.20 1.01
Social Public Liberalism -2.30 5.49 0.13 0.36 1.05
Economic Policy Liberalism -2.24 3.32 -0.10 0.02 1.09
Social Policy Liberalism -2.85 3.11 -0.02 0.01 1.06
Welfare Support 8.90 49.20 17.40 18.50 5.01
Education Support 36.20 78.42 66.31 63.92 8.72
Welfare Spending 0.05 2.53 0.55 0.65 0.47
Education Spending 0.34 4.50 1.35 1.48 0.77
Average Income 5077.91 88157.73 28714.09 30864.37 16817.42
Unemployment Rate 2.30 17.40 5.70 6.07 2.07
Population 294290.00 38625139.00 3510190.00 5153291.11 5664714.59
Union Membership 2.00 42.40 15.00 16.07 8.10
Percent Democrat 20.15 68.70 37.05 37.60 8.10
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Table A.2: Descriptive Statistics (2002)
Variable Min Max Median Mean SD
Individual Level
State Identity 1.00 7.00 5.00 5.21 1.64
Welfare Support 1.00 3.00 2.00 1.74 0.70
Standard of Living 1.00 3.00 2.00 2.23 0.74
Age (scaled) 1.00 4.00 3.00 2.62 1.01
Year Born 1909.00 1983.00 1956.00 1954.93 16.22
Education 1.00 4.00 3.00 2.98 0.95
Family Income 1.00 5.00 3.00 3.15 1.43
State Level
Racial Diversity 0.05 0.48 0.30 0.29 0.10
Population 573.16 34871.84 8552.64 12136.30 9524.12
Average Income 27649.29 58800.86 41296.84 42812.94 5646.43
Percent Democrat 0.22 0.48 0.37 0.37 0.05
Percent White 0.62 0.98 0.82 0.82 0.08
Percent Black 0.01 0.37 0.12 0.13 0.08
Percent Other 0.62 0.98 0.82 0.82 0.08
State level data is from 2002. Individual level data come from The Perceptions of American People
Survey (2002).
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A.1.2 Alternative Models Predicting Public Liberalism
Table A.3: Effect of State Inequality (Gini) and Racial Diversity on Public Economic Liberalism




Racial Diversity 2.37∗∗∗ 1.25∗
(0.51) (0.71)
Public Economic Liberalism t−1 0.67∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02)
















State fixed effects Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 2,248 1,948
Adjusted R2 0.94 0.93
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1, Results include regression coefficients and standard errors
in parentheses from OLS analyses. Durbin Watson tests for all models indicated we cannot
reject the null of no autocorrelation.
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Table A.4: Inequality and Economic Public Liberalism: ADL Lag Specifications
DV: Economic Public Liberalism
(1) (2) (3)
Top 1 0.001 0.0002 0.0005
(0.003) (0.01) (0.01)




Economic Public Liberalism t−1 0.68∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant 0.18∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.07
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,248 2,246 2,194
R2 0.94 0.94 0.94
Akaike Inf. Crit. 313.25 316.47 337.65
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table A.5: Racial Diversity and Economic Public Liberalism: ADL Lag Specifications
DV: Economic Public Liberalism
(1) (2) (3)
Racial Diversity 0.55∗ 1.14 −0.41
(0.28) (4.51) (6.29)




Economic Public Liberalism t−1 0.68∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant 0.001 −0.01 −0.15
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,248 2,246 2,194
R2 0.94 0.94 0.94
Akaike Inf. Crit. 309.40 312.36 332.30
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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A.1.3 Public Support of Education Spending
Figure A.1: Support for Public Education Spending Over Time
Higher values indicate preference for more government spending or intervention. Data has been rescaled to 0
to 1 to facilitate interpretation. Source: General Social Survey (GSS). Survey Item: “Are we spending too
much, too little, or about the right amount on improving the nation’s education system?”
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A.1.4 Models Using Alternative Racial Diversity Measures
The Census Bureau’s data collection on race has evolved substantially, increasing the number of
racial and ethnic categories one can identify with and allowing for identification with more than
one category. In order to use a measure that is consistent over time, I rely on data provided by the
Survey of Epidemiology and End Results Program (SEER). For data access, see https://seer.
cancer.gov/popdata.thru.2017/download.html. Using race estimates provided by
the Census to the National Cancer Institute, SEER has calculated race estimates at the county level
since 1969. This measure categorizes people into one of three groups — white, black and “other.”
An illustration of the percent of the state population that is one of these three groups is shown in
Figures 8-10. As Hispanics can be of any race, those in the white category include those who identify
as Hispanic and non-Hispanic whites. The other category comprises all of those who do not identify
as white or black. Though this measure is limited in that it does not capture ethnicity, it is useful for
my purposes by allowing me to create a general indicator of diversity over a substantially long time
period.
As indicated earlier, accessing high quality data on race by state over decades is difficult. To
compare estimates, I also obtained data from SEER which provides data on race and ethnicity by
state from 1990-2018. This includes data on the four race categories specified under the 1977
standards (Asian or Pacific Islander, Black or African American, American Indian or Alaska Native,
White) as well as ethnicity (Hispanic and non-Hispanic). I recoded data so there were population
estimates for one of five racial/ethnic categories: Hispanic, non-Hispanic Asian or Pacific Islander,
non-Hispanic Black or African American, non-Hispanic American Indian non-Hispanic Alaska
Native, and non-Hispanic White. Again using the Herfindahl index, I calculated a state diversity
measure using this different categorization scheme. There is a high positive correlation (.85) between
the original diversity measure and this shorter diversity measure. When data is recoded so that
the three racial categories are non-Hispanic whites, non-Hispanic blacks, and “other” (the sum of
Hispanic, Asian or Pacific Islander and American Indian or Alaska Native) there is also a high
positive correlation (.87) between this measure and the original measure.
To examine if using these this alternative measures of diversity supports the results I find using
the original, broader measure (1969-2014), I estimate the same models predicting public economic
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liberalism, welfare support and education support shown in the main paper. I interpret the following
results somewhat cautiously given the shorter time series of the data (24 years for the public economic
liberalism model and only 10 years for welfare/education spending model).
The tables below replicates models in Table 2.2 of the manuscript using the two different diversity
measures which span from 1990 to 2014, including 5-group Racial Diversity (Table A.6) and 3-group
Racial Diversity 3 groups (Table A.8). These two tables are identical, where the only difference is
the diversity measure used. For both tables, the first model is the fully specified model including an
interaction term between racial diversity and inequality, as well as controls.
For Model 1 in Table A.6 and Table A.8, the interaction term between diversity and inequality
does not reach statistically significance, though the coefficient term is negative, as expected. To
better understand the interaction term, I include marginal effects plots from Model 1. These plots
are shown in Figure A.2. Figure 8a plots the marginal effect of inequality on liberalism across the
range of diversity values calculated using 5 different racial/ethnic groups, while Figure 8b uses the
alternative 3-group diversity measure. Both marginal effects plots are demonstrably similar to those
provided in the main paper. As levels of racial diversity increases, the likelihood people will respond
to rising inequality with more economic liberalism declines.
In each table, the second model includes an interaction term between inequality and annual
racial diversity change. Instead of annually, the third and fourth models use 3 and 5 year windows
for diversity change. Similarly to model 1, for most of the models the interaction term between
inequality and diversity change does not reach statistical significance (though comes close for some).
However, the coefficient on the interaction term is negative. I include marginal effects plots for 3
year diversity windows shown in Figure A.3. Figure 9a and 9b illustrates the marginal effect of
inequality on liberalism across the range of diversity change values (where positive values indicate
increases in diversity from 3 years prior and negative values indicate decreases). As anticipated,
states with increases in diversity from the three years prior (higher values) respond to inequality with
significantly less public economic liberalism. Simply put: positive changes in diversity are associated
with negative (less liberal) responses to inequality.
I estimate the same models for welfare and education spending from Table 4 using these two
alternative measures of diversity, for a total of 4 models. The data on race and the public opinion
measures from Pacheco (2014) only overlap for 10 years, from 1990 to 2000. Similar to the models
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Table A.6: Effect of State Inequality and Racial Diversity (5 groups) on Public Economic Liberalism
(1990-2014)
(Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4)
Top 1 0.0000 −0.004 −0.001 −0.002
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Racial Diversity 0.37
(0.51)
Racial Diversity Change (1 year) 8.50
(11.57)
Racial Diversity Change (3 year) 7.42
(4.69)
Racial Diversity Change (5 year) 3.14
(3.26)
Economic Public Liberalism t−1 0.54∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Economic Policy Liberalism 0.002 −0.01 −0.01 −0.001
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Unemployment Rate −0.01 −0.02∗ −0.02∗∗ −0.02∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Average Income (log) 0.12 0.15 0.14 0.12
(0.17) (0.17) (0.19) (0.19)
Population (log) 0.24 0.25∗ 0.25 0.17
(0.15) (0.15) (0.18) (0.21)
Percent Democrat 3.76∗∗∗ 3.88∗∗∗ 4.10∗∗∗ 4.22∗∗∗
(0.43) (0.43) (0.49) (0.55)
Percent Union 0.01 0.01 0.003 0.0002
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Top 1 x Racial Diversity −0.02
(0.01)
Top 1 x Racial Diversity Change (1 year) −0.56
(0.64)
Top 1 x Racial Diversity Change (3 year) −0.46∗
(0.25)
Top 1 x Racial Diversity Change (5 year) −0.24
(0.16)
Constant −5.28∗ −5.60∗∗ −6.55∗∗ −5.32
(2.86) (2.78) (3.19) (3.64)
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,248 1,198 1,098 998
Adjusted R2 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.94
Residual Std. Error 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1, Results include regression coefficients and standard errors in paren-
theses from OLS analyses. Durbin Watson tests for all models indicated we cannot reject the null of no
autocorrelation. The Racial Diversity (5 group) measure is computed annually based on percent Hispanic,
non-Hispanic Asian or Pacific Islander, non-Hispanic Black or African American, non-Hispanic American
Indian or Alaska Native, and non-Hispanic White.
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Table A.7: Effect of State Inequality and Racial Diversity (3 groups) on Public Economic Liberalism
(1990-2014)
(Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4)
Top 1 0.002 −0.01 −0.003 −0.004
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Racial Diversity −0.01
(0.48)
Racial Diversity Change (1 year) 5.04
(12.42)
Racial Diversity Change (3 year) 5.99
(4.99)
Racial Diversity Change (5 year) 1.73
(3.47)
Economic Public Liberalism t−1 0.54∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Economic Policy Liberalism 0.0002 −0.01 −0.01 −0.001
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Unemployment Rate −0.01 −0.02∗ −0.02∗∗ −0.02∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Average Income (log) 0.17 0.14 0.13 0.12
(0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.19)
Population (log) 0.29∗∗ 0.23 0.23 0.14
(0.15) (0.15) (0.18) (0.21)
Percent Democrat 3.91∗∗∗ 3.85∗∗∗ 4.06∗∗∗ 4.17∗∗∗
(0.42) (0.43) (0.50) (0.56)
Percent Union 0.01 0.01 0.003 0.001
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Top 1 x Racial Diversity −0.02
(0.02)
Top 1 x Racial Diversity Change (1 year) −0.40
(0.66)
Top 1 x Racial Diversity Change (3 year) −0.39
(0.26)
Top 1 x Racial Diversity Change (5 year) −0.18
(0.17)
Constant −6.49∗∗ −5.33∗ −6.12∗ −4.87
(2.78) (2.77) (3.19) (3.66)
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,248 1,198 1,098 998
Adjusted R2 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.94
Residual Std. Error 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1, Results include regression coefficients and standard errors in parentheses from
OLS analyses. Durbin Watson tests for all models indicated we cannot reject the null of no autocorrelation. The
Diversity (3 group) measure is computed annually based on percent non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic black, and
all others.
97
(a) Using Diversity (5 group) measure (b) Using Diversity (3 group) measure
Figure A.2: Conditional Effect of State Diversity on the Effect of Inequality on Public Economic
Liberalism (1990-2014)
(a) Using Diversity (5 group) measure (b) Using Diversity (3 group) measure
Figure A.3: Conditional Effect of State Diversity Change (3 years) on the Effect of Inequality on
Public Economic Liberalism (1990-2014)
in the main manuscript, Durbin-Watson tests for both models indicate to reject the null of no
autocorrelation. To account for serial correlation in the error term, I estimated the same models
using the Cochrane-Orcutt estimator. The output of these models can be seen in Table A.9, which
includes the two new diversity measures in each of the models. For the first two models, using the
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two diversity indicators predicting welfare support, the diversity and inequality interaction term is
not statistically significant. However, we do find the significant effects in the expected direction
for the education models (Models 3 and 4). What can explain this difference? It may be the case
that in recent years, welfare has become so racialized in the media as benefiting minorities (Gilens,
1999; Clawson and Trice, 2000) that variations in subnational diversity are not as effective as shaping
attitudes on policy areas that are not yet quite as racialized, such as education.
Table A.9: Effect of State Inequality and Racial Diversity on Public Support for Welfare and
Education Spending (1990-2000)
Welfare Support Education Support
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Top 1 0.06∗∗ 0.06∗∗ 0.06 0.06
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
Racial Diversity (5 group) 5.95∗∗ 13.04∗∗∗
(2.58) (4.25)
Racial Diversity (3 group) 4.59∗ 14.80∗∗∗
(2.61) (4.29)
Welfare Supportt−1 0.57∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03)
Welfare Spending Per Capita −0.33 −0.37
(0.32) (0.33)
Education Supportt−1 0.75∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03)
Education Spending Per Capita 0.75 0.72
(0.63) (0.63)
Top 1 x Diversity (5 group) −0.0003 −0.22∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.08)
Top 1 x Diversity (3 group) 0.01 −0.22∗∗
(0.05) (0.09)
Constant 4.00∗∗∗ 4.68∗∗∗ 10.37∗∗∗ 10.09∗∗∗
(1.27) (1.24) (2.95) (2.88)
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 530 546 530 546
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1, Results include regression coefficients and standard errors in parentheses from
OLS analyses using Cochrane-Orcutt Estimation. The Diversity (5 group) measure is computed annually based on
percent Hispanic, non-Hispanic Asian or Pacific Islander, non-Hispanic Black or African American, non-Hispanic
American Indian or Alaska Native, and non-Hispanic White. The Diversity (3 group) measure is computed annually
based on percent non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic black, and all others.
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Table A.8: Effect of State Inequality and Racial Diversity (3 groups) on Public Economic Liberalism
(1990-2014)
(Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4)
Top 1 0.002 −0.01 −0.003 −0.004
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Racial Diversity −0.01
(0.48)
Racial Diversity Change (1 year) 5.04
(12.42)
Racial Diversity Change (3 year) 5.99
(4.99)
Racial Diversity Change (5 year) 1.73
(3.47)
Economic Public Liberalism t−1 0.54∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Economic Policy Liberalism 0.0002 −0.01 −0.01 −0.001
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Unemployment Rate −0.01 −0.02∗ −0.02∗∗ −0.02∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Average Income (log) 0.17 0.14 0.13 0.12
(0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.19)
Population (log) 0.29∗∗ 0.23 0.23 0.14
(0.15) (0.15) (0.18) (0.21)
Percent Democrat 3.91∗∗∗ 3.85∗∗∗ 4.06∗∗∗ 4.17∗∗∗
(0.42) (0.43) (0.50) (0.56)
Percent Union 0.01 0.01 0.003 0.001
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Top 1 x Racial Diversity −0.02
(0.02)
Top 1 x Racial Diversity Change (1 year) −0.40
(0.66)
Top 1 x Racial Diversity Change (3 year) −0.39
(0.26)
Top 1 x Racial Diversity Change (5 year) −0.18
(0.17)
Constant −6.49∗∗ −5.33∗ −6.12∗ −4.87
(2.78) (2.77) (3.19) (3.66)
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,248 1,198 1,098 998
Adjusted R2 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.94
Residual Std. Error 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1, Results include regression coefficients and standard errors in parentheses from
OLS analyses. Durbin Watson tests for all models indicated we cannot reject the null of no autocorrelation. The
Diversity (3 group) measure is computed annually based on percent non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic black, and
all others.
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A.2 Chapter 3 Appendix
Table A.10: The Effect of Racial Group Empathy on Support for Social Safety Net (Without Controls)
Dependent variable:








Constant 2.97∗∗∗ 3.13∗∗∗ 3.40∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.10) (0.10)
Observations 1,346 1,343 1,340
Adjusted R2 0.21 0.19 0.15
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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A.3 Chapter 4 and 5 Appendix
A.3.1 Focus Group Discussion Guide
Consent Process
Consent forms for focus group participants are completed in advance by all those seeking to partici-
pate. Below is a summary of the information in the consent form that focus group organizers and
facilitators should use to make sure participants understand the information in the consent form.
Thank you for agreeing to participate. I am are very interested to hear your valuable opinions on
economic inequality and how you think government should address it.
• The purpose of this study is to learn more about American attitudes towards rising economic
differences between Americans, and this is in the context of this area in South Carolina, but
also more broadly.
• The information you give us is completely confidential, and we will not associate your name
or identifying information with anything you say in the focus group. We understand how
important it is that this information is kept private and confidential. We will ask participants to
respect each other’s confidentiality.
• You may refuse to answer any question or withdraw from the study at anytime.
• If you have any question now or after today, you can contact me (hand out contact card).
Introduction
• Introduce myself.
• Who I am and what I’m trying to do: In this project, we are doing focus group discussions.
The reason for using both of these tools is that we can get more in-depth information from a
smaller group of people in focus groups. This allows us to understand the context behind the
answers given in the written survey and helps us explore topics in more detail than we can do
in a written survey.
• Why we asked you to participate
• Why we are audio-recording & What will be done with this information
• We are going to audio record the focus groups so that we can make sure to capture the thoughts,
opinions, and ideas we hear from the group. No names will be attached to the focus groups
and the tapes will be destroyed as soon as they are transcribed. The transcribed information
will be analyzed and used in my dissertation
• Introduce Research Assistant
Logistics and Explanation of Process
• Explain that focus groups are being used to understand attitudes towards public affairs.
• About focus groups • I am learning from you • Not trying to achieve consensus, we’re gathering
information • No virtue in long lists: we’re looking for priorities • There are no right or wrong
answers.
109
• Logistics • Focus group will last about one hour and 20 minutes • Feel free to move around •
Where is the bathroom? Exit? • Help yourself to refreshments
• Ground Rules • Everyone should participate. • Information provided in the focus group must
be kept confidential • Stay with the group and please don’t have side conversations • Turn off
cell phones if possible
• My job is to guide the conversation, and keep us on time, and make sure we finish at the end
of our allotted session too. So I may interrupt, push us a little faster. That is so we can finish
our conversation on time.
• Ask the group if there are any questions before we get started, and address those questions.
Focus Group Begins
Introductions
• Go around table: Let’s take a moment to go around the room and tell us your name and how
long you’ve lived in South Carolina, and other areas you may have lived in for a significant
amount of time before South Carolina
• Discussion begins, make sure to give people time to think before answering the questions and
don’t move too quickly. Use the probes to make sure that all issues are addressed, but move on
when you feel you are starting to hear repetitive information.
Vignette
• So today we are going to be talking about economic inequality, which is defined as the
differences in how much people have economically. So, this includes peoples’ income (their
wages/salary), but also their wealth (homes, financial assets, other investments). The wider the
difference there is in what people have, the more inequality.
• I’m going to use an example to start. Consider two people in the U.S., Lee and Jay, both 45
years old.
• Lee lives in a 4-story house on the waterfront that is valued at $7 million. Ten years ago when
Lee’s parents died, he used the inheritance they left him to make for a down payment on the
mortgage on his home. Lee’s parents paid for him a local private school and then paid for his
college education. Lee is now a lawyer, and earns $400,000/year.
Jay lives in an apartment complex in a very rural area, where his rent per month is $800. Jay
finished public high school, and could not attend college because he could not afford it. Jay is
currently working as a mechanic at a local garage, earning $32,000/year. The garage he works
at is 20 miles away from where he lives, but Jay cannot afford the cost of living near his place
of work. Jay has no investments.
What we see here is an illustration of economic inequality between Lee and Jay. Lee is
relatively economically advantaged, while Jay is economically disadvantaged.
Questions
• When you think about economic inequality, do you think about in terms of between people
within the country, within the South, within the state or within your own neighborhood?
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• When you think about how you compare yourself to other people in terms of economics, do
you compare yourself to your neighbor, to someone in another area of the state, or to others
across the country?
• When thinking about Charleston, do you think the difference between those who have the
most and those that have the least is wider than the country overall? In other words, is this gap
wider here than in other places?
• How does the inequality in this area compare to other places you have lived? Examples?
• For those who have lived her for some years, are economic differences more apparent after 5,
10, 15 years?”
• Do you feel that it is harder for the average person to get ahead now than it was 10, 20, 30
years ago? Elaborate? To what extent?
• For those who have lived in the same area for a while, how is the place you live now different
from 10, 20, 30 years ago? Explain.
• On a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 = most economic disadvantaged and 10 = most economic
Advantaged, what number would you give yourself? Hold up your number so we can see -
Why did you put yourself on that scale? - What does that number look like to you?
• When we consider government programs that seek to narrow the gap between those who have
the most and those who have the least: Medicaid, food stamps, welfare, unemployment. Who
do you see those government programs as helping? What do you like about them? What do
you dislike? What would you rather them do instead?
• When we consider government problems that seek to narrow the gap between those who have
the most and those who have the least like tax cuts for the wealthy or for large corporations.
Who do you see those government programs as helping? What do you like about? What do
you dislike? What would you rather them do instead?
• Other Probes for Discussion: • Who gets hurt the worst from economic inequality? • Per-
sonal experiences with inequality • Why do we see inequality? • Do those with the most
get appropriate attention from the government? Do those with the least get attention from
government?
Conclusion of Focus Group
That concludes our focus group. Thank you so much for coming and sharing your thoughts and
opinions with us. We have a short evaluation form that we would like you to fill out if you time. If
you have additional information that you did not get to say in the focus group, please feel free to
write it on this evaluation form.
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A.3.2 Focus Group Recruitment
Figure A.10: Charleston Focus Group Advertisement
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